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ABSTRACT 
 Protracted refugee situations are present across the globe and are extremely 
challenging to solve. The international refugee regime, led by the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), has proposed new innovative solutions in an 
effort to create a mutually beneficial outcome for host nations, local communities, and 
refugees as outlined in the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) and the Global Compact 
on Migration (GCM). The European Union (EU) has sought to implement these ideas to 
control migration into the Eurozone after 2015. This thesis examines whether the 
implementation of the new solutions was successful in producing mutual gains for host 
nations, local communities, and refugees. It accomplishes this by examining the 
EU-Jordan Compact and the EU-Afghanistan Joint Way Forward agreement, and by 
comparing the condition of the refugees and the states and communities where they 
reside, both before and after the implementation of the two agreements. This research 
concludes that states benefit the most from these deals, while refugees and local 
communities see minimal or no gains. Both countries' efforts to restructure and take 
ownership of their migration situations were pivotal to their success. However, this 
research also shows that the ideals found within the GCM and GCR can slowly 
incentivize states to change and provide greater benefits for refugees. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Protracted refugee situations occur frequently across the globe and often last for 
generations. These situations are devastating and challenging to solve. At times, they have 
been described as a “wicked problem.”1 There are currently over 70 million displaced 
people worldwide and nearly 26 million are refugees.2 Refugee migration can exacerbate 
domestic problems within states and create more vulnerabilities in nations economically, 
socially, and politically, particularly in developing countries that face resource shortages. 
Refugees can increase poverty, lower wages, create price inflation, create competition for 
resources, and impact access and quality of education. These negative impacts often lead 
to resentment and animosity in host communities. Host states can feel political pressures 
from citizens and external players for them to solve these domestic problems, while the 
flow of refugees into their countries can drain their state’s budgets and exacerbate their 
national infrastructure. There is always hope that refugees will be a temporary problem, 
but the reality is that refugees often stay for many years, even multiple generations. 
Solutions to this wicked problem are difficult to implement, and the international 
community acknowledges that the international refugee regime, led by the United Nations 
High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) needs fixing with new ideas.  
Since 2016, the international refugee regime’s proposed innovative solutions have 
opened some possibilities of creating a win-win for host nations, local communities, and 
refugees. The proposed Global Compact on Migration (GCM) and Global Compact on 
Refugees (GCR) advocate incentivizing development aid to promote resiliency of host 
nations and countries of origin and build livelihoods for refugees. By incentivizing nations 
through development aid, the new refugee regime would benefit communities and decrease 
the political pressure on the state that comes from the presence of refugees. In host nations, 
 
1 Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber, “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,” Policy Sciences 4, 
no. 2 (1973): 155–169, https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01405730. 
2 “Figures at a Glance,” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), accessed 
November 27, 2019, https://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html. 
2 
as the political pressure decreases, the state could then integrate refugees into the local 
society and create conditions that encourage refugees to stay in the host nation and to not 
attempt further migration. The new regime also stipulates that this is possible for countries 
of origin that have large amounts of refugees returning to their country, and therefore entice 
them, to reintegrate these returnees back into society to prevent renewed migration. 
Simultaneously, as state and local communities benefit from development, refugees or 
returnees will be aided from integrating into society, and as a result migration decreases 
outside the region of origin. Indeed, the end goal is to create mutual gains for all. It is an 
ambitious goal, but is it really possible? Can a wealthy nation or regional power implement 
solutions to migration that can morally and effectively reduce migration at home, help 
refugees, and develop host nations or countries of origin and their communities? To test 
this idea and determine if mutual gains are occurring, this thesis examines European 
Union’s (EU) efforts to operationalize these new solutions in Jordan and Afghanistan as 
case studies.  
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The problem of refugees is critical for national security, policy formation, 
international relations, and human rights. With millions of refugees worldwide and 
numbers increasing, both refugees and communities are suffering. The world has a 
responsibility to put forth its best effort to care for such vulnerable populations. Host 
nations, overwhelmingly from the global south, many among the poorest countries across 
Asia, Latin America, and Africa, are getting crushed under the burden of refugees. Some 
of these nations are already fragile, and refugee migration will only further increase their 
fragility.3 In this hyper-globalized world, there is no question that states matter.4 The 
impact of fragile states that collapse or turn to war and conflict cannot be escaped by the 
rest of the world, even the global north, or wealthier countries in North America and 
Europe. There is a global interest in providing for vulnerable populations and improving 
 
3 Alexander Betts and Paul Collier, Refuge: Transforming a Broken Refugee System (London: Penguin 
Books, 2017). 
4 Susan Strange, “The Defective State.” Daedalus, vol. 124, no. 2 (Spring, 1995): 55–74. 
3 
the overall stability of states and regions for humanitarian purposes as well as security 
reasons. 
This research also applies to the realities on the ground in nations such as the United 
States and Britain that have sought to isolate themselves from migration, which have led 
to Brexit and attempts to build walls. The EU’s efforts present a different solution than just 
keeping people out. Although the EU has the end goal of decreasing migration, if they are 
also able to create mutual gains for refugees, host nations, and communities, they will 
potentially set a model for other regional powers around the world. If proven, maybe the 
United States can also limit the pull factors that draw refugees from South and Central 
America and even create more stability in the western hemisphere. Indeed, these innovative 
solutions could be an opportunity for the global north to find a morally and politically 
viable solution to migration—if they work.  
Even when conflicts end, the challenge of migration is not over. When refugees 
return to their country of origin, these returnees face many challenges in reintegrating back 
into society. There is a need to explore legitimate solutions to ensure the livelihood of 
refugees from their movement out of the country to their reintegration back into the country 
upon return. For example, Syrians may be able to return to their country in only a few short 
months or years, and the world needs to be ready to act when that crucial time comes. If 
the EU can illustrate marginal success in solving the refugee migration problem from time 
of flight to return, then the framework of the new refugee regime’s solutions could be 
implemented across the globe. Migration challenges are all over the world and action needs 
to be taken as soon as possible to protect and promote the livelihood of refugees and 
resiliency of existing and host nation communities. Lessons learned from those who are 
implementing these solutions need to be identified, shared, and implemented into future 
approaches as the world seeks to solve one of the most challenging issues on the planet 
today.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The two schools of thought that address solutions for protracted refugee situations 
are characterized by two refugee regimes: the UNHCR prior to 2016 and the new refugee 
4 
regime, the UNHCR post 2016. The old regime has long advocated that the durable 
solutions for refugee situations were repatriation, local integration, and resettlement in a 
third country.5 On the other hand, the new refugee regime, the UNHCR post 2016, 
promotes development aid to host nations or countries of origin to build resiliency of 
nations and livelihood of refugees. Essentially this new approach builds on the second 
durable solution, local integration, while downplaying the other two to accommodate 
present realities across the globe. To assess the viability of this solution, this thesis analyzes 
both the literature around these two frameworks and the pivotal cases of Jordan and 
Afghanistan. These countries’ deals with the EU represent the implementation of the 
solutions by the new regime. Overall, this literature review shows the limitations and 
failures of the old refugee regime’s durable solutions, with a focus on the problems of local 
integration and repatriation.  
The first solution, voluntary repatriation, was considered by the old regime to be 
the premier solution for protracted refugee situations.6 Repatriation intuitively would seem 
to be a solution that should have overwhelming consensus, but there is a debate regarding 
its viability. Scholars such as Katy Long have argued that voluntary repatriation can be 
detrimental when the political, communal, and security conditions are not established for 
refugee return, or if the state and citizenry are not prepared to re-enter into an effective 
relationship with them.7 Scholars also claim that there are various motivating factors by 
host countries, donors, and countries of origins to begin repatriation pre-maturely. 
Additionally, scholars argue that pre-mature repatriation can lead to human rights 
violations upon return. Barbara E. Harrell-Bond argues that reintegration back into their 
 
5  “Compilation of Conclusions Adopted by the Executive Committee on the International Protection 
of Refugees: 1975–2004 (Conclusion No. 1 – 101),” UNHCR, accessed October 25, 2019, 
https://www.unhcr.org/publications/legal/41b041534/compilation-conclusions-adopted-executive-
committee-international-protection.html. 
6 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Compilation of Conclusions Adopted by the 
Executive Committee on the International Protection of Refugees: 1975–2004 (Conclusion No. 1 – 101).“ 
7 Katy Long, “Repatriation in the 21st Century: Learning History’s Lessons?” The Point of No Return: 
Refugees, Rights, and Repatriation (Oxford University Press, 2013); Barbara E. Harrell-Bond, 
“Repatriation: Under What Conditions Is It the Most Desirable Solution for Refugees? An Agenda for 
Research.” African Studies Review 32, no. 01 (1989): 41–70; Kelly, OConnor “The Politics of (re)-
constructing and Contesting Rwandan Citizenship” Refugee Studies Centre Working Paper, no. 92, 2013. 
5 
previous society may be just as difficult or even more challenging than their efforts to 
integrate into the host society.8 Marieke Van Houte shows that the experience of 
displacement, how traumatic or positive it was, directly relates to the refugees ability to 
successfully repatriate back to their country of origin.9  
Essentially, repatriation only can occur when the environment is right to enable 
successful reintegration of this vulnerable group. Even in good political, economic, and 
security environments, returnees need serious protections and assistance, or they may be 
worse off. Unsuitable environments make repatriation a less viable solution. The 
Afghanistan case studies an attempt by the EU to ensure cooperation with the Afghan 
government to repatriate Afghans from Europe and their efforts to ensure that returnees 
properly integrate while also helping host communities. This study will determine if the 
EU is able to ensure the proper conditions of return are met, if they are able to protect and 
reintegrate returnees into society, or if they are continuing the failed efforts of repatriation 
by the old regime.  
The second solution, local integration, is tied up in the debate between the 
competing ideas of refugees as a burden on host nations or an economic benefit. Some 
scholars, such as Gaim Kibreab, argue that refugees have significant human capital they 
can use in being pro-active economic players in the host country, because they are willing 
to make great sacrifices so they can work.10 These scholars believe that a preferred solution 
is to promote complete refugee integration within the host country, which includes freedom 
 
8 Barbara E. Harrell-Bond, “Repatriation: Under What Conditions Is It the Most Desirable Solution for 
Refugees? An Agenda for Research.” 
9 Marieke Van Houte and Tine Davids. “Development and Return Migration: From Policy Panacea to 
Migrant Perspective Sustainability.” Third World Quarterly 29, no. 7 (2008): 1411–1429. 
Barbara E. Harrell-Bond, “Repatriation: Under What Conditions Is It the Most Desirable Solution for 
Refugees? An Agenda for Research.” 
10 Alexander Betts, Louise Bloom, Josiah Kaplan, and Naohiko Omata. Refugee Economies: 
Rethinking Popular Assumptions, University of Oxford Refugee Studies Centre (2014); Gaim Kibreab “The 
Myth of Dependency Among Camp Refugees in Somalia 1979–1989.” Journal of Refugee Studies 6, no. 4 
(1993): 321–349; Karen Jacobsen, “Livelihoods and Economics in Forced Migration” The Oxford 
Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Lionel 
Beehner, “Are Syria’s Do-it-yourself Refugees Outliers or Examples of a New Norm?” Journal of 
International Affairs 68, no. 2 (2015): 157; Oliver Bakewell, “Repatriation and Self-Settled Refugees in 
Zambia: Bringing Solutions to the Wrong Problems” Journal of Refugee Studies, vol. 13, no. 4 (December 
2000), 356–373. 
6 
of mobility and freedom to work, in order to improve the livelihoods of refugees and 
improve the economy of the host state. However, experts such as Karen Jacobsen, who 
advocates for promotion of refugee livelihoods through self-reliance, acknowledges that 
providing the right to work can have detrimental effects to the host countries’ citizens if 
host communities are not benefited first.11 These ideas have now come back to the surface 
as they are being implemented in the new refugee regime.  
The old refugee regime was unsuccessful in promoting local integration and seeing 
refugees as an economic benefit, because of the domestic pressure or burden refugees 
brought to host nations. Scholars show that refugees can have a significant negative impact 
on the labor market of host countries through competition especially in low-skilled jobs, 
and they can create domestic unrest due to security threats and the possibility of 
unbalancing the demographics of the state.12 Research has also shown that refugees can 
lower wages and increase housing costs in addition to straining the capacity of the state on 
sanitation networks, waste management, medical facilities, education, military 
requirements for security, and natural resources.13 When refugees receive more aid and 
have a better life than the host citizens, bitterness and hostility could rise even further.14 
For all these reasons animosity toward refugees are present among host nations.15 These 
negative effects of local integration and public discontent are the primary reasons 
governments want to put refugees in camps, and often if they do not go into camps, they 
are still excluded from the labor market, unrestrained mobility, and from opportunities to 
 
11 Karen Jacobsen, “Livelihoods and Economics in Forced Migration.” 
12 Erik Svein Stave and Solveig Hillesund, Impact of Syrian Refugees on the Jordanian Labour 
Market, Geneva: ILO and FAFO, 2015, https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/–-arabstates/–-ro-
beirut/documents/publication/wcms_364162.pdf; Gaim Kibreab, “Why Governments Prefer Spatially 
Segregated Settlement Sites for Urban Refugees.” Refuge: Canada’s Journal on Refugees 24, no. 1 (2007); 
Lewis Turner. “Explaining the (Non-) Encampment of Syrian Refugees: Security, Class and the Labour 
Market in Lebanon and Jordan.” Mediterranean Politics 20, no. 3 (2015): 386–404; Karen Jacobsen, 
“Livelihoods and Economics in Forced Migration” 
13 Khalid Wazani, The Socio-Economic Implications of Syrian Refugees on Jordan (Konrad Adenauer 
Stiftung: 2014), https://www.kas.de/einzeltitel/-/content/the-socio-economic-implications-of-syrian-
refugees-on-jordan. 
14 Karen Jacobsen, “Livelihoods and Economics in Forced Migration.” 
15 Anne Marie Baylouny, When Blame Backfires: Syrian Refugees and Citizen Grievances in Jordan 
and Lebanon (Cornell University Press (forthcoming), 2020). 
7 
be self-reliant. Scholars have pointed to one advantage of camps is to provoke international 
assistance by having a visible refugee problem they can point to.16 Yet other scholars have 
argued that camps can decreases the sovereignty of the nation as the UNHCR and non-state 
actors provide services and perform functions that the state normally performs.17 The 
Jordan case study shows an attempt by the EU to provide significant development aid to 
Jordan on the condition of the integration of refugees into the host nations society to include 
the formal labor market. This study provides an opportunity to determine if the EU was 
able to use aid to decrease resentment among the host community by addressing the various 
negative effects of refugees on host nations, and thus decrease pressure on the government 
to allow them to integrate refugees. In light of all these challenges refugees bring to host 
nations, the goal of the new refugee regime appears to be a lofty aim.  
The third solution, resettlement, although not significantly addressed by the new 
refugee regime or this research, displays the global north’s lack of desire to solve refugee 
migration by inviting them into their homes. Resettlement is the act of reestablishing 
refugees in new, third countries, but unfortunately resettlement numbers are diminishing. 
In 2016, there were approximately 126,000 refugees resettled in third countries, while in 
2017 there were 65,000 refugees resettled, and in 2018, approximately 55,000.18 The 
United States’ resettlement numbers represent how this decline is taking place across the 
world, as they reflect approximately 78,000 resettlements in 2016, 24,000 in 2017, and 
17,000 in 2018.19 For 2019, the U.S. has allocated a ceiling of 30,000, and for 2020 the 
United States has already established a maximum of 18,000 refugees resettled, the lowest 
 
16 Lewis Turner, “Explaining the (Non-) Encampment of Syrian Refugees: Security, Class and the 
Labour Market in Lebanon and Jordan;” Karen Jacobsen, 2002. “Can Refugees Benefit the State? Refugee 
Resources and African State-building.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 40, no. 4: 577–596; Oliver 
Bakewell, “Encampment and Self-settlement,” The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity (Oxford 
University Press, 2018). 
17 Amy Slaughter and Jeff Crisp, “A Surrogate State? The Role of UNHCR in Protracted Refugee 
Situations,” Protracted Refugee Situations, 123–40; Mac McClelland, “How to Build the Perfect Refugee 
Camp,” New York Times Magazine, 13 Feb 2014. 
18  “Resettlement Data,” UNHCR, accessed October 28, 2019, https://www.unhcr.org/resettlement-
data.html. 
19 “Total Submissions and Departures to the United States of America,” UNHCR, accessed March 28, 
2020, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/resettlement-data.html. 
8 
amount since 1980.20 It is clear that resettlement is only a solution for a few. Experts like 
Kathleen Newland, argue that fear, xenophobia, and anti-terror concerns have negatively 
affected public perceptions and policy, and thus explain the policies generating smaller 
numbers.21 The advantage in resettlement is that nations have complete control over who 
and how many refugees they take, whereas asylum seekers come at any time and in any 
number.22 Despite resettlement having positive results in protecting and caring for 
refugees, it is not a practical solution for the majority.  
Understanding the limitations and failures of the old refugee regime is important in 
analyzing the goals and aims of the new refugee regime. In an effort to overcome the 
shortcomings of the past, the UN has developed two compacts, the GCM and the GCR, 
which outline the new strategy and principles of this new refugee regime. The GCM seeks 
“to optimize the overall benefits of migration,” reduce the impact of irregular migration, 
protect migrants, and help all communities thrive.23 The GCM seeks to create a “win-win” 
environment that is focused on benefiting all people through a focus on improving 
livelihoods to prevent migration; when migration does occur, the GCM promotes social 
inclusion of migrants and the empowerment of migrants to contribute to sustainable 
development wherever they reside.24 It also promotes the need to allow migrants to use 
their human capital to seek the best livelihood opportunities, while at the same time 
acknowledging the need to strengthen the local communities to minimize inequalities and 
 
20Jens Krogstad, “Key Facts about Refugees to the U.S.,” Pew Research Center, accessed October 28, 
2019, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/10/07/key-facts-about-refugees-to-the-u-s/. 
21 Joanne Van Selm “Refugee Resettlement,” The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration 
Studies (June 2014), https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199652433.013.0014; Kathleen Newland and 
Randy Capps, “Why Hide the Facts About Refugee Costs and Benefits?” Migration Policy Institute-
Commentaries, September 2017, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/why-hide-facts-about-refugee-
costs-and-benefits; Maryellen Fullerton, “Terrorism, Torture, and Refugee Protection in the United States” 
Refugee Survey Quarterly, Legal Studies Paper No. 209 (October 2015); Kathleen Newland and T. 
Alexander Aleinikoff, “The U.S. Refugee Resettlement Program Is an Unsuitable Target” Migration Policy 
Institute, Commentaries (January 2017), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/refugee-resettlement-
program-unsuitable-target. 
22 Joanne Van Selm “Refugee Resettlement.” 
23 United Nations, “Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration” (New York: July 
2018), accessed November 25, 2019, https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/sites/default/files/
180713_agreed_outcome_global_compact_for_migration.pdf, 3. 
24 United Nations, “Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration,” 3.  
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public discontent. In this light, the GCM seeks to use migration to fulfill the UN 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development for wherever migrants are located. Overall, the GCM 
provides a framework for international cooperation led by national policy and strategy to 
prevent migration, protect and empower migrants, benefit host communities through 
development, and to create conditions for refugees to return and reintegrate in their 
countries of origin. The GCM as a framework does not provide much detail on how these 
goals could be accomplished, especially by using development to help solve migration 
issues. However, the GCR provides much more clarity on how the new refugee regime’s 
beliefs could be executed.  
The GCR has four objectives: to “(i) ease pressure on host countries;(ii) enhance 
refugee self-reliance; (iii) expand access to third country solutions; (iv) support conditions 
in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity.”25 It does not disregard the long-held 
durable solutions, but rather, it seeks to address the root causes of protracted refugee 
situations “to facilitate access to durable solutions” and address the needs of host 
communities.26 Two major themes that run through the document are that refugees and 
host communities both need attention and support, and that responses to any refugee 
situation must be led by the national leadership and their objectives. The GCR also requires 
national governments to create a comprehensive plan, or support plan, regarding how to 
address support to refugees and their own resilience efforts which includes humanitarian 
and development needs.  
Additionally, the Global Refugee Forum, groups of states in the international 
community, or other actors would come together through pledges and donations to fund 
the objectives of individual states’ support plans. The GCR states, “The mobilization of 
timely, predictable, adequate and sustainable public and private funding nonetheless is key 
to the successful implementation of the global compact.”27 In line with the GCM, this is 
 
25 United Nations, “Global Compact on Refugees,” Report of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (New York, 2018). accessed November 25, 2019, https://www.unhcr.org/gcr/
GCR_English.pdf, 2. 
26 United Nations, “Global Compact on Refugees,” 16. 
27 United Nations, “Global Compact on Refugees,” 6. 
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all in an effort to benefit host countries, refugees, and host communities. This benefit for 
host nations and refugees largely surrounds the idea of using international funding to allow 
host nations to continue to progress toward sustainable development goals, support 
educational quality and access, access to health systems, empowering and protecting 
women, girls, and youth, and ensuring negative environmental impacts are mitigated. Yet 
the major benefit to refugees and host nations is that the GCR advocates that refugees and 
host communities have economic opportunities and access to the labor market in order to 
promote livelihoods. It also mentions a possibility of host nations working out preferential 
trade agreements when there is a large amount of refugee participation, which could attract 
investment. Funding would also be used to help promote durable solutions such as ensuring 
the proper conditions for repatriation and support for their reintegration. The GCR also 
seeks to “enlarge the scope, size, and the quality of, resettlement programmes.”28 Overall, 
the GCR and GCM outline the new priorities and strategy of the new refugee regime that 
seek to create win-win or mutual beneficial opportunities.  
Alexander Betts and Paul Collier wrote Refuge: Transforming a Broken Refugee 
System, that encapsulates the ideas surrounding the new refugee regime’s solutions. They 
argue that the old refugee regime’s durable solutions were highly unsuccessful, and that in 
“2015 fewer than 2% of the world’s refugees received access to one of the durable 
solutions. The international systems have therefore become long-term humanitarian aid 
providers.”29 They argue that every refugee should expect “rescue, autonomy, and an 
eventual route out of limbo,” but that the options they are faced with are either “long-term 
encampment, urban destitution, or perilous journeys.”30 As pioneers in the new refugee 
regime, they argue that refugee situations must be looked at as not only a humanitarian 
issue, but also as an opportunity for development where states can benefit from 
development growth and refugees can benefit from increased livelihood opportunities and 
greater autonomy. They claim that fragile states are a driving force for creating refugees 
and that a lack of livelihood opportunities within the region of origin cause refugees to 
 
28 United Nations, “Global Compact on Refugees,” 18.  
29 Betts and Collier, Refuge: Transforming a Broken Refugee System, 8. 
30 Betts and Collier, Refuge: Transforming a Broken Refugee System, 7, 9. 
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make long and dangerous journeys. They, too, promote a win-win approach that gets at 
solving the previous collective action problem that suggests the global north funds the 
global south’s hosting of refugees with incentives to promote economic participation and 
livelihoods for refugees. They promote host nation economic and development through 
international community funding, preferential trade agreements, and integrating global 
business incentives. They claim that this funding benefits the global north by de-
incentivizing mass refugee movement. They show how their ideas were influential in 
creation of the first compact with this approach in the EU-Jordan Compact. In general, their 
approach was adopted by the new refugee regime.  
It is important to note that these ideas have not been universally accepted. There 
are scholars, such as Cindy Huang, who do support the notions and principles of such 
global compacts and the new refugee regime, although they acknowledge that such 
compacts are not perfect and that it must be associated with proper policies.31 However, 
there are many as well who reject these global compacts or view them with great 
skepticism. For example, the United States, Hungary, Czech Republic, and Poland voted 
against it and six other EU-nations abstained or did not vote.32 Major criticisms consists 
of concerns such as sovereignty, the unethical approach of having the global north shirk 
 
31 Michael Clemens, Cindy Huang, Jimmy Graham and Kate Gough, “Migration Is What You Make 
It: Seven Policy Decisions that Turned Challenges into Opportunities” Center for Global Development, 
May 2018, accessed November 25, 2019, https://www.cgdev.org/publication/migration-what-you-make-it-
seven-policy-decisions-turned-cha”llenges-opportunities; Cindy Huang, Nazanin Ash, Katelyn Gough, and 
Lauren Post, “Designing Refugee Compacts: Lessons from Jordan.” Forced Migration Review 57, February 
(2018), https://www.fmreview.org/syria2018/huang-ash-gough-post; “A global compact on migration: 
placing human rights at the heart of migration management,” European Union, November 1, 2019, 
accessed November 25, 2019, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/614638/
EPRS_BRI(2017)614638_EN.pdf; Heliodoro Temprano Arroyo, Using EU Aid to Address the Root Causes 
of Migration and Refugee Flows (Florence: EUI, 2019), https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2870/463755. 




their responsibilities for caring for refugees by providing aid, security concerns, and the 
feasibility of actually operationalizing the GCM.33   
The EU has sought to implement the principles of the GCR and GCM. The Council 
of the EU in 2016 articulated that reducing the flow of irregular migration by working 
through comprehensive partnerships or compacts was its top priority.34 The EU 
determined to mobilize significant amounts of money “to address the root causes of 
irregular migration and forced displacement and to build up the capacity of host 
communities.”35 The EU implemented the tenets of the new refugee regime through the 
creation of compacts and other agreements with other countries. They have created many 
agreements, yet those which are considered in this thesis are the EU-Jordan Compact 
(Jordan Compact) and the EU-Afghanistan Joint Way Forward Agreement (JWF).  
The literature surrounding the Jordan Compact examines whether the aims of the 
new refugee regime are being achieved or not in a country of first asylum. The compact 
redefines a new comprehensive relationship between Jordan and the EU. It focuses on 
establishing monetary, trade, and development incentives by the EU that benefit the 
government and host nation communities while Jordan agrees to integrate Syrian refugees, 
which includes access to the formal labor market.36 Significant amount of literature 
presents the Jordan Compact as the hopeful demonstration of mutual gains to host nations, 
 
33 “Briefing: The New Global Refugee Compact,” The New Humanitarian, 18 December 2018, 
https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2018/12/18/briefing-new-global-refugee-pact; “Briefing: 
The New Global Migration Compact” The New Humanitarian, 12 December 2018, 
https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2018/12/12/briefing-new-global-migration-pact; Georgi 
Gotev, “Nine EU Members Stay Away from UN Migration Pact;” Ferruccio Pastore, “Not So Global, Not 
So Compact,” Istituto Affari Internazionali, January 8, 2019, https://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/not-so-
global-not-so-compact. 
34 “Communication from the Commission on Establishing a New Partnership Framework with Third 
Countries under the European Agenda on Migration” Council of the European Union (Brussels: 9 June 16) 
accessed September 23, 2019, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10014-2016-INIT/en/pdf. 
35 Council of the European Union, “Communication from the Commission on Establishing a New 
Partnership Framework with Third Countries under The European Agenda on Migration,” 17. 
36 “Annex to the Joint Proposal for a Council Decision on the Union Position within the Association 
Council set up by the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement Establishing an Association Between The European 
Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, of the other 
part, with Regard to the Adoption of EU Jordan Partnership Priorities and Annexed Compact,” Council on 
the European Union (Brussels: 20 September 2016), accessed September 23, 2019, 
https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12384-2016-ADD-1/en/pdf. 
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refugees, countries of origin, and their financiers as advocated by new refugee regime, as 
it reflects the operationalizing of the GCR.37 Another response to the compact reflects that 
there is some hope to achieve these aims, but that so far the agreement has not produced 
substantial gains for refugees, especially in regards to formal labor market participation.38 
Research shows that the agreement has produced real benefits to Jordan in terms of aid and 
development.39 However, the ability to maximize the trade deal which includes the 
utilization of special economic zones to both benefit refugees and Jordan has not yet been 
realized.40 The literature lacks a comprehensive explanation of the actual compact and all 
its components. The literature also does not explain how the government of Jordan 
approaches the compact. In that regard, there is little information regarding whether Jordan 
 
37Council on the European Union, “… Adoption of EU Jordan Partnership Priorities and annexed 
Compact;” Paul Collier, “If You Really Want to Help Refugees, Look beyond the Mediterranean,” The 
Spectator, August 8, 2015, https://www.spectator.co.uk/2015/08/if-you-really-want-to-help-refugees-look-
beyond-the-mediterranean/; Betts and Collier, Refuge: Transforming a Broken Refugee System; 
Shyamantha Asokan, “A View of Migration: A Win-Win for Refugee and Tech” Sci Dev Net, January 15, 
2016, http://www.scidev.negt/global/migration/analysis-blog/view-migration-win-place-refugee-jobs.html; 
Heliodoro Temprano Arroyo, Using EU Aid to Address the Root Causes of Migration and Refugee Flows. 
38 Katharina Lenner and Lewis Turner, “Making Refugees Work? The Politics of Integrating Syrian 
Refugees into the Labor Market in Jordan,” Middle East Critique 28, no. 1 (January 2, 2019): 65–95, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/19436149.2018.1462601; Still in Search of Work – Creating Jobs for Syrian 
Refugees: An Update on the Jordan Compact, International Rescue Committee, April 24, 2018, accessed 
August 17, 2019, https://www.rescue.org/report/still-search-work-creating-jobs-syrian-refugees-update-
jordan-compact; Daniel Howden, Hannah Patchett, and Charlotte Alfred, “The Compact Experiment: Push 
for Refugee Jobs Confronts Reality of Jordan and Lebanon,” Atavist, December 13, 2017, 
http://issues.newsdeeply.com/the-compact-experiment. 
39 Jordan Response Platform, “JRP 2018 Financial Update,” 30 May 2019 accessed September 23, 
2019, http://www.jrp.gov.jo/Files/JRPFinancialUpdate(Year2018).pdf; Cindy Huang and Kate Gough, 
“The Jordan Compact: Three Years on, Where Do We Stand?,” Center for Global Development, accessed 
July 22, 2019, https://www.cgdev.org/blog/jordan-compact-three-years-on; “Joint Staff Working Document 
Report on EU-Jordan relations in the Framework of the Revised ENP,” Council of the European Union 
(Brussels: 13 June 2017), accessed September 23, 2019, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/
ST-10319-2017-INIT/en/pdf. 
40 “Council Decision on the Position to be taken, on behalf of the European Union, within the 
Association Committee Established by the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement Establishing an Association 
Between The European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Hashemite 
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“Why Jobs in Special Economic Zones Won’t Solve the Problems Facing the World’s Refugees” The 
Conversation, 6 April 2017. https://theconversation.com/why-jobs-in-special-economic-zones-wont-solve-
the-problems-facing-the-worlds-refugees-75249; Heliodoro Temprano-Arroyo, “Promoting Labour Market 
Integration of Refugees with Trade Preferences: Beyond the EU-Jordan Compact,” SSRN Electronic 
Journal, 2018, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3293829. 
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is able to take ownership of the situation and capitalize on the donations to benefit Jordan’s 
resilience?  
The literature concerning the JWF also discusses whether the aims of the new 
refugee regime are being achieved or not in Afghanistan. The JWF is a non-binding 
readmission agreement that ensures cooperation from the Government of Afghanistan to 
allow for returns, while the EU promises a financial incentive package to benefit the 
government, existing communities, and returnees through reintegration efforts and job 
creation opportunities.41 Major consensus exists that the JWF is extremely negative for 
returning refugees, as they are put into an unsafe environment within a fragile state, and 
many organizations have called for all returns under the agreement to be stopped, even in 
the EU.42 Research has shown that livelihood opportunities often are worse after returning 
to Afghanistan.43 The literature lacks any evidence whether there have been any benefits 
for the existing communities, governments, or refugees due to the JWF. It also lacks the 
perspective whether aid packages had any major increases after the JWF was signed, and 
whether the government of Afghanistan was able to take ownership of the situation. 
 
41 “Joint Way Forward on Migration issues between Afghanistan and the EU,” European Union, 
October 2, 2016, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/
eu_afghanistan_joint_way_forward_on_migration_issues.pdf.  
42 Claire Rimmer, “EU Migration Policy and Returns: Case Study on Afghanistan,” European Council 
on Refugees and Exiles (Belgium, 2017), https://www.ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Returns-Case-
Study-on-Afghanistan.pdf; Amnesty International, “Forced Back to Danger: Asylum Returns from Europe 
to Afghanistan.” (London, 2017) https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/
ASA1168662017ENGLISH.PDF; Marion Guillaume, Nassim Majidi, Samuel Hall, “From Europe to 
Afghanistan: Experiences of Child Returnees,” Save the Children Resource Centre, October 16, 2018, 
https://resourcecentre.savethechildren.net/library/europe-afghanistan-experiences-child-returnees; “The 
EU-Afghanistan Joint Way Forward on Migration: A New Low for the EU,” International Federation for 
Human Rights, accessed November 11, 2019, https://www.fidh.org/en/issues/migrants-rights/the-eu-
afghanistan-joint-way-forward-on-migration-a-new-low-for-the; “Addressing Refugee and Migrant 
Movements: The Role of EU External Action,” Office Journal of the European Parliament, April 5, 2017, 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2017-0124_EN.html?redirect. 
43 World Bank Group and UNHCR, “Living Conditions and Settlement Decisions of Recent Afghan 
Returnees: Findings from a 2018 Phone Survey of Afghan Returnees and UNHCR data” June 2019, 
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Living-Conditions-and-Settlement-Decisions-of-
Recent-Afghan-Returnees-Findings-from-a-2018-Phone-Survey-of-Afghan-Returnees-and-UNHCR-
data.pdf; Tabasum Akseer, Mohammed Shoaib Haidary, Khadija Hayat, Fahim Ahmad Yousufzai, “Survey 
of The Afghan Returnees 2018” Asia Foundation, https://asiafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/
A-Survey-of-the-Afghan-Returnees-2018.pdf; Abdullah Mohammadi, Mohammad Jalal Abbasi-Shavazi, 
and Rasoul Sadeghi, “Return to Home: Reintegration and Sustainability of Return to Post-Conflict 
Contexts,” Demography of Refugee and Forced Migration, International Studies in Population (Springer 
International Publishing, 2018), 251–70, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67147-5_13.  
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Another connection that the literature fails to explore is the connection between the JWF 
and the EU-Turkey agreements.  
There are important unanswered questions in the literature surrounding the JWF 
and Jordan Compact that should be explored and brought to light. This thesis hopes to add 
to the existing dialogue on the operationalization of the GCR and GCM and determine 
whether mutual benefits have occurred or not.  
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
My hypothesis prior to research was that overall, mutual gains do occur among 
refugees, host nations, and host communities, but that the degree of gain is unequal for the 
EU, the state, and the refugees. The EU, who is a regional power and has the ability to seek 
its own self-interest above all others, secures their own “win.” The next “winner” is the 
host nations and countries of origin, who are capitalizing off the interests of the EU to 
decrease migration to Europe. Depending on how well the host nation or country of origin 
can take ownership in the refugee situation, they benefit from the aid, development 
projects, and money that is provided by the international community.  
Additionally, my hypothesis is that refugees who are in a position of disadvantage 
and not part of the negotiations, always get the worst part of the deal; however, they may 
be better off with the agreements than without them. I explain my approach to address these 
hypotheses as part of the research design.  
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The EU has entered multiple deals with various countries in order to address its 
refugee migration problems. EU’s deal with Jordan is chosen as a case study because it is 
the pilot program to operationalize the global compacts. Additionally, the Jordan Compact 
lays out specific measures to produce mutual benefits to include the creation of a better 
trade relationship, large money, and development packages to promote resiliency at home, 
and incentives to promote livelihoods of refugees. The Afghanistan compact provides an 
opportunity to analyze the implementation of the principles of the new refugee regime on 
the return of refugees. A good solution for promoting hosting refugees is only half a 
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solution, whereas finding solutions for the return of refugees to their country of origin is 
crucial part of this conversation. Afghanistan also is important because of the thousands of 
lives lost there since 2001 and the billions of dollars that the United States has already 
spent in the country therefore giving it a vested interest in the country. Overall, Syrian and 
Afghan refugees represent the two largest refugee communities.44   
In order to analyze these two cases, the comparative approach is used. This thesis 
compares the livelihood of refugees and the impact of refugees or returnees on the state 
and local communities before and after each agreement to determine if mutual benefit 
occurred for the state, communities, and refugees. The Jordan Compact claims that the 
livelihoods of refugees, the amount of aid given to the nation, education for both refugees 
and the host communities, trade, and the labor market will all be benefited. Therefore, I 
examine these areas prior to the Jordan Compact and after to determine if there was a 
benefit. I primarily use official EU documents, Jordan Government documents such as the 
annual Jordan Response Plans, surveys of refugees, and studies on education and labor 
markets, to determine if the details of the agreement produced mutual gains.  
The JWF allows for the return of Afghan refugees to Europe and in return the EU 
would provide monetary and development benefits to the state and to the primary re-
integration organization, the International Organization for Migration, in order to prevent 
migration, increase livelihoods of returnees, and address needs of the existing community. 
There is also evidence that this agreement ensured the continuation of international aid by 
the EU. Therefore, the benefits of international aid are also examined. Just as in the case 
with Jordan, I examine each group before and after the agreement to determine whether 
there were mutual gains. I examine official EU documents, Afghan government 
documents, aid budgets, developmental programs by the World Bank and other 
organizations, refugee surveys, and academic studies on the return process to determine if 
there were actual mutual gains.  
 
44  “Figures at a Glance,” UNHCR, accessed November 27, 2019, https://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-
glance.html. 
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F. THESIS OVERVIEW  
This thesis has five chapters, including an introduction, background information on 
the EU, a chapter on the Jordan Compact, a chapter on the JWF agreement, and a 
concluding chapter that brings an analysis of these cases together. Chapter two is a short 
section that gives the background on why the EU was so desperate for solutions to refugee 
migration. Chapters three and four both compare the states of Afghanistan and Jordan 
before and after their respective agreements and determine whether they were able to create 
a win-win. In chapter three, the delivery of aid to Jordan due to the Jordan Compact is 
analyzed by comparing the impact on refugee livelihoods, education, the labor market, and 
the ability of Jordan to be able to capitalize on this aid. In chapter four, aid packages and 
programs that have come through JWF and other EU-Afghan agreements is analyzed to 
compare the impact on returnee livelihoods, the ability of the Afghan government to make 
the most of this aid, and any sign of benefit to the existing communities. The last chapter, 
the conclusion, lessons learned are presented and recommendations for U.S. policy. 
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II. BACKGROUND: THE EU’S SOLUTION TO THE 2015 
MIGRATION CRISIS 
The 2015 migration crisis significantly impacted two long-held identities within the 
European Union (EU): the identities of being a unified bloc of European nations working 
to preserve peace and prosperity and being a leader in humanitarian principles. Unity is at 
the heart of the creation of the EU. The EU is a supranational entity that united modern 
nation states in order to establish peace and prosperity. Both World War I and World War 
II derived out of disunity within Europe, and the creation of the EU is a border system that 
incentivizes unity over war. All member states are defined by this unity and were willing 
to unite under a governing body and give up certain rights and powers to the EU. The EU 
also “presents itself as a champion of liberal democratic values” and as a leader in human 
rights.45 In 2015 these identities clashed as the geo-political architecture was challenged 
by hundreds of thousands of migrants entering the EU. This chapter argues that the geo-
political implications of this migrant crisis created legitimacy and identity problems for the 
EU and, in an effort to preserve the EU itself and its identities, the EU decided to outsource 
migration control to other countries. In order to demonstrate this argument, I present the 
incentives for migration into the EU and the crisis that unfolded due to the interaction of 
failed border policies and enforcement and by the unilateral decisions of member states not 
to abide by EU policy. I show how these failures led to the reemergence of the identity of 
sovereignty in member states. Lastly, I will articulate how the migration crisis of 2015 led 
to no major border policy changes within the EU, but instead how the EU outsourced 
migration control to other countries for self-preservation and to maintain their European 
identities.  
By the end of 2015, a flow of over 1.8 million irregular migrants entered the EU.46 
How did this happen? Failed border policies and enforcement at a time of regional 
 
45 Klaus Dodds, Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University 
Press, 2019), 109.  
46 Marion MacGregor, “Changing Journeys: Migrants Routes to Europe” Info Migrants, February 13, 
2019, https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/15005/changing-journeys-migrant-routes-to-europe.  
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instability outside the EU, led to a situation where the EU failed to successfully manage 
flows of people across its borders.47 The two major border policies were the Schengen 
Agreement and the Dublin Regulation. The Schengen Agreement was signed in 1985 and 
created the Schengen Area where member states of the agreement do not enforce their 
borders. The Schengen Area “remains one of the world’s biggest areas that have ended 
border control between member countries.”48 Any one within the agreement can 
essentially travel unhindered to other states within the Schengen Area. This area that was 
seemingly without borders was symbolic of this European identity of unity.49 However, 
Paul Collier and Alexander Betts argue that this lack of internal borders was overly 
symbolic of that unity and that the policy failed to ensure practical immigration control.50 
An internal policy that did not enforce borders may have worked well if there was effective 
external border policies and robust external border enforcement, but that was not the case.  
The Dublin Regulation and the border enforcement agency, Frontex, were the 
primary tools the EU used to control flows of people. The Dublin Regulation “prescribed 
that the first European country in which an asylum seeker arrived” is responsible for 
registering the migrant, for determining the asylum case, and for ensuring that onward 
migration did not occur into other member states.51 However, there was no incentive for 
front-line countries of the EU to maintain the burden of thousands of migrants, and 
therefore the incentive was to not enforce the Dublin Regulation but allow for onward 
migration to other member states without registering the migrants.52 This weak border 
policy was partnered with a weak border enforcement agency, and Frontex was not like 
 
47 Alexander Betts and Paul Collier, “The Panic,” Refuge: Transforming a Broken Refugee System 
(London: Penguin Books, 2017), 62–94. 
48 “Schengen Agreement” Schengen Visa Info, last modified October 1, 2019, 
https://www.schengenvisainfo.com/schengen-agreement/.  
49 Alexander Betts and Paul Collier, Refuge: Transforming a Broken Refugee System (London: 
Penguin Books, 2017), 63. 
50 Betts and Collier, Refuge: Transforming a Broken Refugee System, 63.  
51 Betts and Collier, Refuge: Transforming a Broken Refugee System, 63. 
52 Betts and Collier, Refuge: Rethinking Refugee Policy in a Changing World, 65. 
21 
U.S. Border Patrol with direct responsibility for enforcing borders in the EU.53 Rather, 
Frontex was a small force with loaned border agents that coordinated with other member 
states’ border agencies to help secure the outer borders of the EU, and therefore most of 
the manning and budget was dependent upon member states.54 This led to a situation in 
which the EU had minimal ability to provide deliberate enforcement of borders, and the 
majority of the onus was indirectly heaped on the member states. Weak border policies and 
enforcement created a picket fence around the EU’s borders and coastline which extend 
more than 30,000 miles.55 If one simply jumped the picket fence, they had free reign of all 
the Schengen Area. The EU was living in a false sense of security for years because its vast 
coastline, or natural borders, had made it extremely dangerous to cross, especially 
regarding the Mediterranean Sea. It is possible these weak border policies were made 
considering the idea that geography would protect the EU from major flows of people. 
Regardless, soon the dangers of the Mediterranean were overpowered by incentives for 
people to come to Europe.  
A major incentive for migration to Europe occurred as the Arab Spring in 2011 
enabled illegal smuggling routes to be exploited into Europe and created an impetus for 
migration due to major instability and violence.56 The Arab Spring began in northern 
Africa and spread across the Middle East. It challenged autocratic rule with pro-democratic 
protests. Regimes fell in North Africa while other regimes hardened their stance, such as 
the Syrian Regime which led to a protracted civil war that caused millions to flee and seek 
refuge outside Syria’s borders. Syrian refugees became the largest population of refugee 
migration on the globe. The demand for human smuggling was great. The Arab Spring 
resulted in North African countries losing control over parts of their northern borders, and 
smugglers exploited the instability to create pathways into Europe across the 
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Mediterranean Sea.57 Eventually smugglers created multiple routes via land and sea. With 
pathways created into Europe, migrants from the Middle East, Africa, and Asia did the 
mental analysis and chose to take the risk of a potentially deadly journey to seek a better 
life in Europe.58  
As migrants flowed into the EU, the Dublin Regulation broke down and the 
Schengen Area was penetrated by migrants.59 The Dublin Regulation was really put the 
test in Greece and Italy, where more than 100,000 migrants entered Italy and 800,000 in 
Greece during 2015.60 Both of these countries’ asylum systems were overwhelmed. Both 
countries simply could not manage the flows of people. In Greece, migrants were waiting 
up to two years for their asylum case to be heard, and in result Greece provided camps to 
house them.61 Yet, these border states were unable to keep migrants from moving onwards 
to other EU countries. First, migrants would simply leave the border country and seek work 
in the informal sector in other member states.62 Second, front-line states turned a blind eye 
to migrants and did not register them, so that if they were caught in another member state 
then they would not be returned to that border state.63 The EU’s open border policies 
created chaos. What made matters worse was that in August 2015, the Chancellor of 
Germany, Angela Merkel, decreased the effectiveness of both border policies even further 
by inviting refugees to come to Germany. Germany’s decision to not abide by EU external 
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border policy accelerated the rate and amount of migration into the EU. As border policies 
were failing while being undermined by Germany, the activation of identities played the 
greatest role in determining the EU’s solution to the crisis.  
The rise in migration flows into the EU in 2015 led to a clash or conflict between 
the two major EU identities of unity and being a humanitarian world leader, and in result a 
reemergence of the identity of sovereignty and nationalism within member states occurred. 
Germany clearly displayed this identity of being a humanitarian by opening its borders but 
showed a lack of unity within the EU by not following EU border policy. Almost 
immediately upon the announcement of Merkel’s announcement to open Germany’s 
borders, alterity arose, and other countries began shutting down borders. Hungary’s Viktor 
Orban activated the identity of national sovereignty and decided to stop the flow of 
migration into the EU by building a wall along its southern border. Immigration has been 
shown to create a public and political backlash which can be activated by xenophobic 
sentiments and the imperative to protect national identities.64 The far-right political 
backlash was often not only anti-immigration, but also anti-EU as has been seen with 
Brexit.65 Far right policies began to increase throughout the EU.66 The result was a partial 
disintegration of the free flow of people in the Schengen Area. Ainhoa Ruiz Benedicto and 
Pere Brunet argue that politicians “manipulated public opinion to create irrational fears of 
refugees. This xenophobia sets up mental walls in people, who then demand physical 
walls.”67 They also explain that by 2018, ten member states had established walls on their 
borders. Indeed, by March 2016, many member states began enforcing their own borders.68 
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The EU identity of unity was overpowered in many instances by the identity of sovereignty, 
which resulted in physical enforcement of borders on the ground. 
The other major EU identity of being a world leader in human rights was in crisis 
at the same time. The natural border that the EU had relied upon for so many years to help 
control migration was causing death as flows of migrants continued to enter the EU. Over 
3,700 migrants were killed in the Mediterranean in 2015.69 The migration crisis created a 
humanitarian crisis, which put the EU in the limelight of the world. International outrage 
occurred as deaths in the Mediterranean soared and as the image of Alan Kurdi, a three-
year-old Syrian refugee who had washed onto Turkey’s shores, spread across the internet 
and television. The EU was in a tough spot. It wanted to maintain unity within the EU and 
maintain its humanitarian values, but member states began to question the importance of 
unity and the international community began to question the EU’s self-proclaimed role as 
a humanitarian world leader. The EU was in desperate need of a solution to their migration 
problem.  
The EU initially decided to try to share the burden of migration across member 
states, and appeal to the idea that unity could solve the problem. In late 2015, the EU 
determined to help Greece and Turkey by relocating 160,000 migrants to other member 
states over the course of two years.70 Yet by the end of those two years, less than 30,000 
had been resettled.71 The EU was simply not united behind this cause. The migration crisis 
was creating more disunity, and therefore because they were not working together, they 
were unable to achieve any successful solutions to help the migrants. Their stock as a leader 
in humanitarian values was plummeting. It appeared to the EU that they were unable both 
help migrants and stay unified. Pressuring member states to help the migrants was not 
politically viable for the EU. Therefore, the EU decided not to seek an internal solution. In 
result, the EU maintained its border policies while it desperately tried to salvage the 
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Schengen Area. It found a new solution outside of its borders, which they hoped could 
appease the member states. Their new approach was more about maintaining the European 
identity and its legitimacy than anything else.  
The EU’s solution was to outsource migration. By June 2016, the EU published 
their new approach that established a new partnership framework with third countries with 
“the ultimate aim [to] act in a coordinated manner putting together instruments, tools and 
leverage to reach comprehensive partnerships (compacts) with third countries to better 
manage migration in full respect of our humanitarian and human rights obligations.”72 The 
document outlines three goals of the approach: safeguard human life in the Mediterranean, 
increase the rate of return, and decrease migration to the EU by encouraging refugees to 
stay local rather than take perilous journeys. Additionally, to ensure refugees and migrants 
stay local, the EU set out on an ambitious goal to address the root causes of migration by 
allocating a potential EUR 62 billion. Essentially the EU decided it was going to solve its 
migration issues with money. The EU claimed it could create mutual gains for host nation 
citizens and third countries through development and incentivize refugees to be integrated 
into these societies. The EU wanted to operationalize the ideals and theories found in the 
GCM and GCR. By June 2016, the EU had already created a major deal with Turkey, and 
was in process of major deals with Jordan and Lebanon, while 16 other deals in other 
African and Asian nations were being discussed.73 Outsourcing through the EU’s 
pocketbook became the solution to their identity problems and provided a way for them to 
appear to be living by their humanitarian principles and keep the EU from disintegrating 
due to the public and political backlashes of migration. 
In conclusion, this chapter illustrated that the EU’s solution to their migration crisis 
in 2015 was driven by a desire to maintain European identity and legitimacy. The crisis 
ultimately began because the Dublin Regulation failed to control the flow of people into 
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the EU when regional instability broke out after the Arab Spring. The lack of enforcement 
of the Schengen Area enabled mass migration across the EU. The symbolic policy of unity 
in the Schengen agreement was replaced by walls that symbolized the fragmentation of the 
EU and the reemergence of the identity of sovereignty. Due to questions of legitimacy from 
within and among international observers of their handling of the humanitarian crisis in the 
Mediterranean, the EU created a policy of self-preservation. It outsourced migration 
control to other countries as an attempt to reinforce their humanitarian identity by 
encouraging migrants not to make the dangerous trip across the Mediterranean. The EU 
incentivized governments and the locals to remain in place. The reduction in the flow of 
refugees through partner countries could have brought legitimacy to the EU as a supra-
national entity that has stemmed migration. However, this policy essentially reinforced the 
demands of the far-right populists and further separated the global north and south. It 
remains to be seen if these policies will be able to preserve the legitimacy of the EU and 
its identities within member states and within the international community. The 
comprehensive partnerships on migration that were made with Afghanistan and Jordan will 
be now be analyzed to understand whether the EU was able to achieve its objectives to 
execute the ideals and theories of the GCM and GCR, while seeking first and foremost to 
maintain its identities.  
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III. THE EU-JORDAN COMPACT FOR THE SYRIAN REFUGEES 
By 2016, life was getting difficult in Jordan. The impacts of the Syrian refugee 
crisis in Jordan were taking its toll on a nation that already had a significant amount of 
economic and domestic challenges. Jordan’s weak economy was deeply affected by the 
instability the Arab Spring brought to the region and the impacts of the wars in Syria and 
Iraq. Hundreds of thousands of refugees coming from Syria added further detriment to 
Jordan’s economy, schools, infrastructure, public works, and natural resources. The 
Jordanian government was unable to properly manage these impacts or afford to pay for 
them. All parties to include citizens and Syrian refugees were suffering due to the situation 
in Jordan.  
This was the environment in which the new refugee regime’s ideas concerning the 
global compact took root. In 2016, Jordan was asked to play a major role in executing these 
new ideas and essentially lead the pilot program for the world. Could politicians, world 
leaders, academics, and business leaders, and multi-lateral organizations come together and 
prove that there was a better way of helping refugees and host countries? Some might argue 
that the Jordan Compact was an attempt at a win-win approach, but such terminology is 
arguably inappropriate given the difficulty of the refugee’s plight. A better way of 
expressing the idea of a win-win is that “deals should be based on the principle of mutual 
gain,” or to ask if livelihoods are improving because of these policies.74 Therefore, I argue 
that the Jordan Compact does produce some mutual gains by empowering refugees with 
access to part of the formal labor market and benefits Jordan through trade incentives and 
development growth through the EU’s willingness to pay. However, those relative gains 
among refugees and Jordan are extremely unequal. To support this argument, this chapter 
presents the situation of Jordan prior to the Jordan Compact to include the impact of 
refugees on the country, explains the shift toward more ownership by the Jordanian 
government, and explains the genesis of the Jordan Compact. Lastly this chapter reviews 
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what exactly is written in the compact and addresses the mixed results that have occurred 
through the growing pains of implementing the Jordan Compact.  
A. JORDAN’S DECLINING SITUATION FOLLOWING THE ARAB 
SPRING   
Jordan has relied on aid from other countries to keep it afloat for decades. Jordan 
has struggled to develop anything close to an export economy. It has had a deeply negative 
trade imbalance for decades and by 2011, Jordan exported less than 3 billion dollars of 
merchandise and imported over 13.2 billion dollars’ worth of merchandise.75 Jordan was 
importing four times as much as it was exporting, which created the largest trade deficit 
the country had ever known. The Arab Spring and the civil war in Syria only worsened 
Jordan’s national challenges after 2011. The Arab Spring led to domestic turmoil in Jordan, 
where citizens came out in mass protest and one primary motive was the economy. From 
high poverty, unemployment, and inflation rates, to regressive tax-codes that hurt the 
poorest, to the war in Iraq removing subsidies for oil and gas that was needed for 
transportation and heating, the economic condition did not bode well for Jordan.76 The 
Arab Spring also brought on energy issues for the country. Due to multiple attacks on the 
Arab Gas pipeline in 2011, Egypt stopped the flow of natural gas to Jordan, when 
previously “Egypt provided Jordan with 250 million cubic feet of natural gas daily since 
2004.”77 This energy crisis crushed Jordan’s economy, costing Jordan JD 4.5 billion by 
the end of 2012, which was equivalent to 20% of Jordan’s GDP.78 After the Syrian civil 
war kicked off, Jordan was stuck between war on both sides. Eventually, these wars 
lowered Jordan’s GDP growth rate by 1% in 2013 and caused export routes to Iraq and 
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Syria to close, which in 2014 had accounted for 16% of its export market.79 Additionally, 
these conflicts created a decline in foreign direct investment, tourism, and revenue from 
exports that further slowed down the rate of growth of Jordan.80 Just as the instability of 
the region was hurting Jordan’s struggling economy, hundreds of thousands of Syrian 
refugees poured into Jordan, making the situation more challenging.  
B. THE IMPACT OF SYRIAN REFUGEES UP TO 2016 
By the start of 2016, there were over 635,324 Syrian refugees in Jordan, with 115, 
671 living inside camps, and 519,653 living outside them.81 This translates into 82% of 
refugees living among Jordanian citizens. It is important to note that there were some 
750,000 Syrians in Jordan prior to the Syrian civil war, already living and working in 
Jordan.82 Jordan often uses figures of well over a million in regards to Syrians they are 
caring for, but the number of refugees is below 675,000.83 Despite the number games, 
Jordan has taken in a significant amount, approximately 11% of the overall Syrian refugee 
crisis. Only Turkey and Lebanon took more Syrians.84 The total impact of Syrian refugees 
on Jordan was significant. Jordan reported in 2016 that the cost of “direct and indirect 
expenses” due to hosting Syrian refugees was USD 6.6 billion.85 Although these numbers 
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are most likely inflated, the refugees created substantial pressure on society at large in 
various forms.86  
In 2014, Khalid Wazani conducted a study concerning the socio-economic 
implications of refugees on Jordan that provides a good overview of the overall impacts.87 
He showed that Syrians stressed the waste management system and that Jordan did not 
have enough garbage trucks, garbage containers, and workers. Wazani shows that 
sanitation networks were strained and there was a risk of sewage contaminating the water 
basin that Zataari camp resides on. Additionally, medical centers were crowded, and many 
lacked proper facilities, equipment, and staff. Geographic expansion led to the need for 
more roads and lighting for the roads. Wazani adds that water became even more scarce 
and vulnerable as demand grew at schools, military locations, and residential areas, which 
was further exacerbated by Syrians who were accustomed to using more water than 
Jordanians. In terms of education, he explains that 80,000 Syrian children were registered 
in 2013 leading to issues such as overcrowding, high student to teacher ratios, and less time 
in school due to schools moving to a double shift schedule, therefore lowering the 
educational quality. The study showed other negative impacts such as housing costs rising 
over 100% in some areas due to Syrians sharing housing units and using cash assistance to 
cover the bill. Lastly, Wazani addressed the impacts on the labor market. He showed that 
Syrians were competing with Jordanians for jobs, especially because they would accept 
lower wages in large part because the UNHCR could provide for any needs the refugees 
may not be able to provide. Indeed, the refugee crisis created a burden on the Jordanian 
economy, schools, infrastructure, public works, and natural resources. All these problems 
cost money, which is something Jordan lacked. This chapter focuses on two areas of 
impact, education and the labor market, to later assess the effects of the compact on Jordan.  
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1. Refugee Impact on Education 
Education in Jordan has taken a major hit with the influx of over 100,000 students. 
Jordan was willing to give all Syrians a free education and by the end of 20I5 it was 
estimated that there were approximately 125,000 students enrolled in school both in and 
outside of the camps.88 Overcrowding is a major issue that has caused schools to adopt the 
double shift approach, where some children go to school in the morning and other children 
go to the school in the afternoon. This approach allows for more children to be taught, but 
the cost is more burdensome to teachers and gives less time for children in the classroom, 
which results in lower quality teaching and education.89 In the 2016 Jordan Response Plan 
(JRP), determined that 300 new schools and 8,600 new teachers would be needed to reach 
national standards of 17 students per teacher, 27 students per class, and 19 classes per 
school.90 In terms of refugee children not going to school, the phrase ‘lost generation’ is 
often used to convey what occurs when an entire generation does not get educated. Yet the 
impact is significant for the host nation as their education is extremely constrained and 
pushed to its operational limits. Jordanian youth are not be part of a lost generation, but 
their generation was at risk of suffering from lower quality teaching and learning. In this 
era of globalization, human capital in higher levels of education is one of the main drivers 
to improve inequality and provide opportunities to bring countries like Jordan out of global 
economic obscurity. A decrease in quality of education was a major impact of the surge of 
refugees, and one that was going to have lasting consequences on Jordan society.  
2. Refugee Impact on the Labor Market  
Labor market effects of the Syrians are contested by various studies, but regardless 
the perceptions of Jordanians can be negative. A study in 2016 by Belal Fallah, Caroline 
Krafft, and Jackline Wahba focused on the impacts of refugees in Jordan and showed that 
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there was minimal impact in regards to wages and employment rates, and Jordanians who 
lived in highly concentrated areas with refugees had the same labor market outcome as 
those who lived around less refugees.91 However this thinking has not pervaded public 
opinion. Another study by the International Labor Organization (ILO) and Fafo concluded 
that due to the influx of refugees unemployment has risen, Syrians have crowded out 
Jordanians in lower skill jobs in the informal sector, crowded out some Jordanians in the 
formal market, and caused a decline in work environment due to Syrians being willing to 
work for less and in worse conditions.92 The Jordanian Department of Statistics validates 
some of the claims of crowding out of the formal market by showing that from 2011–2013, 
Syrians gained a five percent increase in new jobs, and Jordanians had a seven percent 
decrease in new jobs over that time.93 Another major viewpoint is that Syrians have had 
less competition with Jordanians and more with Egyptians who make up most of the 
informal labor market in Jordan.94 Although the exact impacts of refugees on the labor 
market have are debated, the unfortunate thing for host countries is that perception appears 
to be most important.    
Perception regarding benefits to refugees that exclude citizens or negatively impact 
citizens is an issue that comes with almost every refugee situation. Jordan reported to the 
European Council that Jordanians were “blaming them [Syrian refugees] for loss of job 
opportunities and overstretched resources, such as water, energy, education facilities and 
health care services.”95 In April 2013, Wazani also cited a study by University of Jordan’s 
 
91 Belal Fallah, Caroline Krafft, and Jackline Wahba, “The Impact of Refugees on Employment and 
Wages in Jordan,” Journal of Development Economics 139 (June 2019): 203–16, https://doi.org/10.1016/
j.jdeveco.2019.03.009, 27. 
92 Svein Stave and Solveig Hillesund, The Impact of Syrian Refugees on the Jordanian Labour Market 
(Jordan: International Labour Office, Fafo Institute for Applied International Studies, 2015), 
https://www.ilo.org/beirut/publications/WCMS_364162/lang–en/index.htm, 7.  
93 Jordan Independent Economy Watch, Socio-Economic Impact of Syrian Refugees on Jordan: 
Turning Challenges into Opportunities, 18.  
94 Katharina Lenner and Lewis Turner, “Making Refugees Work? The Politics of Integrating Syrian 
Refugees into the Labor Market in Jordan,” Middle East Critique 28, no. 1 (January 2, 2019): 65–95, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/19436149.2018.1462601. 
95 “Eleventh meeting of the EU-Jordan Association Council,” Association Between the European 
Union and Jordan (Brussels: 9 October 2014) accessed September 23, 2019, 
https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14134-2014-INIT/en/pdf, 9.  
33 
Center for Strategic Studies, that 87% of the study’s population believed that Syrians 
should not have been able to live outside of camps and 92% believed Syrians negatively 
impacted Jordanians ability to get jobs.96 Perception of refugees having a better existence 
than citizens was the reality in some cases. In Mafraq governate, where Zaatari refugee 
camp is located, there were some Syrians who donated or sold food at discounted rates to 
poor Jordanians because the refugees were living better than they were.97 It is often the 
most poor that are at the greatest risk to be at competition with refugees and have a feeling 
that they are being excluded or ignored by their state. Due to this reason Jordan developed 
specific policies that did not allow refugees to work in the formal sector or allow those in 
the camps to leave the camps to work in the informal sector, which are all done to appease 
the Transjordanian community, which is the King’s political base.98 Jordan was willing to 
take in the Syrian refugees, but not willing to give them the freedom which could lead to 
more protests and possibly destabilize its country. 
C. THE LIVELIHOOD OF SYRIAN REFUGEES IN JORDAN UP TO 2016 
Understanding the livelihood of refugees in Jordan up to 2016 is important in order 
to delineate the effects of the Jordan Compact. Karen Jacobsen wrote extensively on 
displaced livelihoods and how it related to social exclusion, which may help one 
understand the plight of livelihood for Syrian refugees.99 She explains that displaced 
livelihood is the ability of refugees to gain a living coming from a “position of loss,” 
confronting the policies of the host country, and having the services and programs of 
humanitarian assistance.100 She argues that one must be able to access their livelihood 
assets, or material and human capital, such as work experience, skills, or education. She 
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adds that when livelihood assets are constrained or denied, then that person is experiencing 
social exclusion. She further argues that when refugees come from this position of loss, 
having lost jobs, land, housing, and property in their home country, they often flee to safety 
only to be constrained by the policies of host countries. There they do not have access to 
their human capital in order to seek employment or integration into society. Finally, she 
explains that this has a disempowering effect on refugees as they try their best to recover 
in a constrained environment. This was the experience of Syrians in Jordan. Syrians are 
constrained by the policy that forbids them to work in the formal sector of the economy 
without a work permit, to which they have had little to no access. As mentioned previously, 
Syrians can at times benefit by working in the informal sector of the economy, because 
they are willing to work for lower wages and in any condition. Still, this competitive and 
unregulated environment can lead to poor work conditions and sub-minimum wages.101  
What kind of access to livelihood assets did the Syrians have in Jordan? Amnesty 
International (AI) has said that those in camps “have access to education, health care, water, 
food and cash for work programmes, provided by the UN, national and international 
organizations,” but those outside camps have significant barriers in accessing public 
services.102 AI explains in detail some of these barriers such as the requirement for all 
refugees outside the camp to have a UNHCR Asylum Seekers Certificate and a Ministry 
of Interior (MoI) service card. Additionally, any Syrian who was in the camp but left 
without being bailed out by a Jordanian guarantor is not eligible. “In order to obtain the 
new MoI service card, Syrian refugees must present themselves at their local police station 
to request their identity documents, which had been confiscated by the Jordanian 
authorities at the border, confirm their place of residence through providing a stamped lease 
agreement or ‘residency statement’ from UNHCR and a copy of the landlord’s identity 
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document.”103 AI explains how “slow, cumbersome and costly” it can be to get all the 
documents needed to have access, and lacking the proper documents a refugee could face 
being moved to a camp or deported.104 AI also claims that before 2014, those with MoI 
cards received free health care, but in 2014, Jordan changed its policy to require Syrians to 
pay the uninsured rate. These policies were obstacles to access and protection.  
Although access to public services was difficult, maybe the biggest constraint was 
the lack of access to the formal sector of the economy. Syrians had no access to the public 
sector which employs 42% of Jordanians, unless they had a work permit.105 The ILO lays 
out the steps it takes to get a work permit.106 The ILO reports if a person is a resident of a 
camp or came into Jordan illegally then that individual does not qualify, and all Syrians 
cannot work in a job sector that competes with Jordanians. Those sectors in which Syrians 
were excluded are as follows:  
Medical professions  
Engineering professions  
Administrative and accounting professions  
Clerical work including typing and secretarial work  
Switchboards, telephones and connections works  
Warehouses works  
Sales works, including all groups  
Haircutting works (coiffeur)  
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Decoration works  
Teaching professions, including all specialties except for the rare ones when 
there is no Jordanian available  
Fuel selling in main cities  
Electricity professions  
Mechanical and car repair professions  
Drivers  
Guards and servants  
Buildings servants107 
The ILO clarifies that in order to apply for a work permit one must have the 
following documents: 
Application form  
Two copies of the work contract  
Valid vocational license of the establishment  
A copy of a valid passport for the worker  
Proof from the Social Security Corporation of workers’ subscription 
Ministry of Interior’s identity card108 
The ILO also states that although Jordanian law says employers should pay an 
employee’s permit fee, most often the worker is responsible, and the cost can be as high as 
USD 200–USD 1000. Additionally, the ILO shows that if it is the first time someone is 
applying, their name goes before a committee at the Labor Ministry for approval. The 
amount of constraints placed on a Syrian in order to work deeply hinders anyone from 
being able to successfully get a permit. It is no surprise then that prior to 2016 there were 
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less than 5,000 permits issued to Syrians.109 Overall the formal labor market with its 
protections and opportunities were largely closed to the Syrian refugee population before 
2016.  
Education was a crucial part of the Compacts and the focus of much attention by 
international organizations. Jordan assessed that almost 100,000 Syrian children were not 
going to school because of costly transportation and school materials, and the need for their 
children to work.110 As a result, Syrians worry about their children becoming the lost 
generation. While they have technical access to education, economic constraints often 
hinder them from taking advantage of this access. In 2016, Syrian refugees’ human capital 
was being excluded due to the policies of the host country, and the children were not 
building their human capital. These situations did not make the Syrian’s future look bright.  
D. INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT UP TO 2016 
The Syrian refugees and Jordan both needed help. There was international support, 
but not enough. How do you get money when you have refugees? Jordan is no stranger to 
the game of playing the international community for aid. During the immigration of Iraqi 
refugees, Jordan was unable to use the Iraqi refugee presence effectively to generate 
international assistance since there were no visible camps, and therefore a major reason 
Jordan continues to build camps is to ensure financial support from the international 
community.111 Jordan does its best to try to ring the bell as often and as loud as possible 
to claim that the international community is not doing their part, and reiterate the negative 
impacts that Jordan is taking on. The first three major pledging conferences for the Syrian 
conflict were held in Kuwait. The pledging conferences in 2013 promised USD 1.5 billion 
in funding, 2014 increased to USD 2.4 billion, and 2015 increased again to USD 3.8 billion. 
However, in 2013 only USD 1.09 billion was received and in 2014 just USD 1.3 billion 
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was actually received from pledges.112 False promises were what a good portion of the 
pledges meant, and it is also important to note that these funds did not just go to Jordan but 
to Syrians themselves and regional actors who were affected like Jordan. Jordan needed 
this international support to fund its response plans. The international assistance was not 
enough therefore to meet the needs of the 2013 JRP, for it would have taken USD 1.3 
billion to execute the entire plan, but only USD 1.09 billion was donated to the entire region 
by the international community.113 Prior to 2016 the Jordan response plans were only ever 
funded to 33%.114 Jordan was in a precarious position and needed to find a way to turn 
their situation around. Jordan was not negotiating from a position of power and leverage. 
Yet if for some reason, there came a situation in which Jordan had leverage, what would it 
want? 
E. THE GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN’S PRIORITIES  
On 9 November 2014, Jordanian officials met in Brussels for the 11th meeting of 
the EU-Jordan Association counsel.115 Mr. Nasser Judeh, the minister of foreign affairs, 
represented Jordan at the meeting. Mr. Nasser announced a 10-year economic and social 
framework for the country, which is called Jordan 2025 A National Vision and Strategy 
(Jordan 2025), that focused on “deliverable and realistic objectives, consist of action plans 
and … built around five topics: human resource development; economic development; 
social development; decentralisation and governance development; rule of law, justice and 
legislation.”116 Jordan wanted development. Nasser addressed the impacts of the Syrian 
refugees and public discontent, and then “emphasized that Jordan would not slow down its 
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reform process regardless of what would happen in the region.”117 He clearly articulated 
that Jordan’s priority is first and foremost reform or development, over the needs of the 
refugees. The EU wanted to further their mobility partnership with Jordan that “manage [s] 
migration in an orderly manner, facilitating legal migration and fighting irregular migration 
in accordance with international standards.”118 As part of the meeting, Jordan provided a 
statement to the EU that said in the context of the EU being Jordan’s biggest partner in 
trade and the fact that Jordan has a significant trade imbalance with the EU, Jordan wanted 
to push for an agreement that would simplify the rules of origin stipulations on trade. 
Jordan’s desire for development and better trade relations with the EU and the EU’s desire 
for a mobility partnership to control immigration foreshadowed the Jordan Compact that 
would be approved by the EU two years after that.  
F. JORDAN TAKES OWNERSHIP OF THE REFUGEE CRISIS  
The documents and content of the Jordan response plans show a shift toward taking 
the lead role of the response away from the UNHCR, in order to pursue Jordan’s goals. 
The 2013 JRP appears to have been led by the UNHCR.119 The majority of the plan is 
focused on Syrian refugees’ protection and support and less on Jordan’s resilience. There 
are no Jordanian government flags or symbols on the document, but only a single UN 
symbol. In 2014, there is more of an effort to focus on resilience, but the document itself 
only has a UN symbol on it and the plan is called The Syria Regional Response Plan which 
implies that it is not Jordan’s plan.120 In 2015, there was a major shift in how Jordan 
approached their response. They took charge. The top of the cover of the document has the 
Jordanian government crest, the title is “Jordan Response Plan” and at the bottom of the 
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page there is a little UN symbol next to another Jordan Government symbol.121 Jordan 
took over as the primary leader of the response in Jordan and enhanced their ability to 
pursue their national interests. Increased involvement of international organizations in a 
country can limit one’s decision-making, but Jordan took back the reigns from the 
UNHCR. They increased in their ability to control the affairs of this crisis happening within 
their own borders. The 2015 JRP reflects this new approach. A few excerpts from the first 
page of the document highlight the shift of the Jordanian government. Under the 
subheading, “A Nationally Owned and Led Plan” the JRP says: “The Jordan Response Plan 
2015 seeks to bridge the divide between resilience and humanitarian systems….adopts a 
resilience-based approach to respond to and mitigate the effects of the Syria crisis on 
Jordan and Jordanian host communities.”122 It additionally says:  
The JRP 2015 embeds the refugee response into national development 
plans, helping to implement sustainable service delivery systems that meet 
the needs of both refugees and vulnerable host communities. This approach 
will help to ensure that, in line with the principles of national ownership, 
alignment, and harmonisation adopted in the Paris Declaration, the response 
is led by the government123  
This JRP makes clear that Jordan’s refugee response would be on their terms. An 
interesting and simple test to further showcase the change in priorities is by doing a simple 
search within the first three JRPs for the word livelihood which indicates a focus on Syrian 
refugees and for the word resilience which indicates host country priorities. In 2013, there 
were 13 instances of livelihood and only 1 instance of resilience.124 In 2014, it was 39 and 
45, respectively.125 In 2015, livelihood was mentioned 65 times and resilience 223 
times.126 Resilience was mentioned once in 2013 and 223 times in 2015, which reinforces 
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the idea that Jordan had shifted to a Jordan-led “resilience-based approach.”127 JRP 2015 
established 11 sectors for which it would allocate resources to both Syrian livelihood and 
Jordanian resiliency efforts.128 In early 2015, Jordan furthered their ability to control and 
direct all efforts from the international community by developing the Jordan Information 
Management System for the Syria Crisis (JORISS).  
JORISS is a “government owned online project submission, approval, tracking, and 
monitoring & reporting system for the JRP,” that ensures proper coordination, monitoring, 
accountability, and transparency of all projects and funding.129 It is a simple idea, but 
effective at keeping Jordan in control and always in the lead. JRP 2016 outlines how it 
works.130 It says, any agencies or other international organization can upload any project 
into JORISS for approval by the government. If all established standards are met to include 
meeting JRP output standards, then the project will be approved. In addition to projects 
flowing through the government so does all the funding. All monitoring of projects and 
tracking of money can be observed on JORISS. Jordan has managed to find a way to create 
a system that flows projects and money through their government to achieve the 
developmental goals of the state. As mentioned previously, the 2015 JRP was only funded 
at 33%, but now Jordan had the framework to achieve serious gains if somehow they could 
negotiate from a position of advantage and get the attention of pocketbooks of the global 
north. Jordan was ready for the political opportunity that knocked on their door in 2015.  
G. NEW IDEAS AND POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY  
The opportunity came from some fresh new ideas from academics outside Jordan. 
In 2015 Jordan was trying to figure out how to get support and dollars into their robust JRP 
to produce their developmental goals outlined in the Jordan 2025. In 2015, a Jordan 
thinktank, WANA, invited Alexander Betts, a political scientist with an expertise in 
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refugees, and Paul Collier, an economist, to help work on this project.131 Betts and Collier 
visited the King Hussein bin Talal Development Area, on which the government spent over 
GBP 100 million, and saw that it was only at 10% capacity, and they thought maybe the 
on-hand resource of thousands of refugees could be put to work.132 In the end, they 
presented an idea that would fall in line with Jordan’s new approach toward their refugee 
situation. They pitched the idea that Syrians could be drivers of economic development by 
using them for work in special economic zones that could attract foreign business.133 This 
would benefit Jordanians by helping them achieve developmental goals and the Syrian 
refugees by helping them improve their livelihood and help the refugees “incubate their 
post-conflict recovery in Syria.”134 The EU believed there could be support for Jordan 
within the international community to provide better trade deals within established Special 
Economic Zones (SEZs) and that there would be business and corporate social 
responsibility incentives for multinational corporations to move and operate out of 
Jordan.135 They saw this as a way for Jordan to reach their goal of being able to transition 
to a manufacturing economy so that they might be more competitive globally.136 Lastly 
their proposal sought to help solve the Syrian reconstruction problem before the war was 
over, by increasing the autonomy and livelihood of Syrians in Jordan, so that after the war 
they could move businesses and skills back to Syria.137 This proposal that came about in 
early 2015—that could save Jordanians and Syrians from many of their troubles and help 
Jordan reach many of its development goals—was just an idea without any power behind 
it. What they needed was an alliance or partnership. They needed a great power if anything 
was going to happen. Think of the Ottoman Empire: when they were almost destined for 
ruin before World War I, the only hope for the empire was to align with a great power. The 
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Ottoman Empire’s fate was determined by their alliance with the Central Powers, and until 
that great power’s defeat, they had the hope of a long-lasting life for their empire. Jordan 
found such a life-saving great power partnership in the EU.  
Just as the July Crisis was the impetus for the Central Powers to align with the 
Ottoman Empire, the refuge crisis of 2015 was the impetus for the EU to join with Jordan 
in a mutual benefiting partnership. Europe needed a way to stop migration flows into 
Europe and Jordan needed someone to promote their JRPs. The proposal by Betts and 
Collier would be the key to bringing such a partnership together. In September 2015, when 
David Cameron, the prime minister of Great Britain, came to Jordan, King Abdullah 
suggested Betts’ and Collier’s proposal to him, and then Cameron took the idea to the 
World Bank and the EU.138 The question is why would Cameron really care about Jordan 
as a way to solve the EU’s refugee crisis? The answer is that there was a fear that refugees 
in Jordan “might head en masse for Europe.”139 Somehow Jordan became vital to Europe’s 
relief from their refugee crisis. Even though Jordan does not border Europe, Jordan was 
able to identify itself as a buffer state like Turkey.140 Cameron furthered argued that in 
order to stop the flow of refugees into Europe, a policy could be undertaken to stabilize 
and further develop countries that are close to Syria as an incentive for them to stay in the 
region.141 Collier argued that it was immoral to keep tempting refugees to come to Europe 
with so much risk and danger associated with it, but rather he argued to “stop the policy of 
temptation” by developing job havens in the region for Syrian refugees through European 
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incentives.142 In the end the deal proposed by Betts and Collier theoretically became a 
three-way beneficial deal, with incentives for both Jordan and Syrian refugees, and the EU 
limiting the flow of refugees into their nations. This idea, sparked in March 2015, became 
a reality less than a year later at the 2016 pledging conference for Syria Refugees on 4 
February 2016, when Jordan made a deal with the EU that would later be called the Jordan 
Compact. With this partnership Jordan knew these new pledges for coming years, which 
totaled over 12 billion dollars, 70% of which came from the EU, were going to allow it to 
really start achieving its goals.143 One Jordanian official called 2016 Jordan’s “golden 
year.”144 They were now in a position of advantage to seek their own goals.  
Betts’ and Collier’s ideas turned into the EU Jordan Partnership Priorities and its 
annex the EU-Jordan Compact or simply the Jordan Compact. Although the ideas of the 
Jordan Compact were agreed to in February 2016 and some aspects implemented 
immediately, the compact was not fully designed or approved by the EU until December 
2016. It will be important to review in depth how these ideas were transformed into a new 
EU- Jordanian partnership and EU-Jordan Compact. Overall the document outlines a new 
all-encompassing relationship between the EU and Jordan with three main priorities: 
increasing security and stability of the region, improving social and economic development 
in Jordan, and fostering democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.145 Yet the document 
provides context for the whole reason for this new relationship in its first section:  
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The Partnership Priorities ... build on the momentum created by the London 
Conference of 4th February 2016…aimed at sustaining Jordan’s 
development gains against a background of continued humanitarian 
assistance and adequate host community support. The EU and Jordan aim 
to turn the challenges posed by the Syria crisis into concrete opportunities 
to the benefit of the population of Jordan, the Syrian refugees, and the EU. 
However, specific measures taken in support of Syrian refugees will not be 
at the detriment of other people residing and seeking protection in 
Jordan.146  
The compact clearly outlined that this relationship is intended to generate three-
way mutual gains between the government of Jordan, Syrian refugees, and the EU, but 
additionally that in the process Jordanian citizens will not be hurt. Protecting Jordanians 
was a key point the government of Jordan ensured was understood. King Abdullah did not 
want this deal to backfire on him with more protest and public discontent, and therefore he 
assured his people on the onset of the deal that for every job given to the Syrians, five jobs 
would be created for Jordanians.147 
H. THE EU-JORDAN COMPACT 
The Jordan Compact lays out the specifics of the agreement. The compact claims 
that it is a “holistic approach for dealing with the Syrian refugee crisis” that supports the 
Jordan Response Plan 2016–2018 and Jordan 2025 and improves Jordan’s resilience and 
Syrian refugee’s “access to livelihoods opportunities.”148 In order to provide such 
livelihood opportunities, Jordan agreed to allow Syrians to “obtain work permits, set up 
small businesses, and engage in trade.”149 The compact lays out the effort to create jobs 
for both Jordanians and Syrians through simplifying the EU’s rules of origin (ROO) 
requirements for ten years in 18 SEZs under the condition that in the first two years 15% 
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of the jobs would go to Syrian refugees and 25% the years following. The overall objective 
that was agreed to was to have 200,000 work permits or jobs for Syrian refugees. The 
benchmarks agreed were that by the end of 2016 Syrians would have 50,000 jobs, by the 
end of 2017, 75,000 jobs, and by the end of 2018, 100,000 jobs with the caveat, “provided 
there is sufficient demand for working permits.”150 The compact assumed there would be 
massive growth in this trade sector. Additionally, the EU promised massive grants and 
access to financial resources. The EU ensured that Jordan would have the ability to access 
“financial resources at concessional terms for large scale investment/ infrastructure 
projects.”151 Overall EUR 747 million dollars in funding was provided to Jordan to include 
a EUR 200 million Macro-Financial Assistance operation and EUR 108 million 
humanitarian assistance.152 The compact opened the pocketbook of EU for Jordan to 
pursue its developmental goals.  
The compact addresses the impact of refugees on the educational system and EU’s 
migratory concerns. The EU promised budgetary support in order to build more schools 
and provide more funding for teachers, books, and operational costs. The EU also 
committed to extend further funding for higher and technical education, modernization of 
education institutions, and mobility of students and researchers. Jordan committed to build 
capacity to have 190,000 Syrians in school during the 2016–2017 school year, while at the 
same time ensuring the quality of education did not diminish.153 In addition to cooperation 
in natural resource management, security and counter terrorism, and political and human 
rights reform, the EU ensured it addressed its highest concern which was deterring 
migration to Europe. They both agreed to “strengthening the capacity of … Jordanian 
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authorities to manage borders and prevent irregular migration.”154 The Jordan Compact 
addresses the major impacts of Syrian refugees on Jordan and provides a document that 
encapsulates the ideas of Betts and Collier, and the goals of the Jordanian Government and 
EU. Essentially the idea that EU pays, Jordan develops, and Syrian’s livelihood improves 
were the idealistic notions that were encapsulated in the document. It was a revolutionary 
new approach to tackle a complex and challenging protracted refugee problem, but would 
it work?  
I. JORDAN GAINS THE ABILITY TO FUND DEVELOPMENT  
In order to evaluate if the compact was able to produce mutual gains, an evaluation 
of the impacts on Jordan’s resiliency goals, Jordan’s trade, Syrian livelihoods, and 
education are addressed. Did Jordan benefit from this compact? More than the citizens, 
refugees, and even the EU. It will be challenging to ever place a number on how many 
refugees Jordan deterred from moving to Europe, but due to Jordan closing its border in 
2016, Jordan has not received any substantial increase in refugees. Indeed, creating the 
potential for a higher quality of life in Jordan did not bring an influx of refugees. There is 
a possibility that the compact deterred people from leaving Jordan, but then again a senior 
UNHCR official said there never really was any data that supported the notion of a Syrian 
migration from Jordan to Europe.155 While it may be hard to determine if the EU 
significantly benefited from this compact, it is easy to see how Jordan did. The first JRP 
created within the context of the Jordan Compact was the 2017 JRP, which was 65% funded 
with approximately USD 1.7 billion dollars.156 Any country that can drive 65% of its 
developmental goals for a year from international support is significant for development 
progress. In 2018, the JRP was funded at approximately 64% for a total of USD 1.5 billion 
dollars.157 Over 3 billion dollars have gone toward Jordan’s efforts to develop and to 
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address this crisis in the first 2 full years since the compact was created, and since June 
2019 the EU alone has provided Jordan over EUR 2.1 billion.158 Jordan is capitalizing off 
the compact, but this is not how Jordan sees it. They claim that since 2011, the refugee 
crisis has cost them over USD 11 billion, and any gap in the JRP funding is going to have 
to come out of the Jordanian government’s pocket.159 Jordan would claim that it is still 
operating within a major deficit. Yet Jordan Independent Economy Watch has said “that 
costs estimated by the government … cannot be attributed to the refugee crisis alone,…the 
costs involved should ideally be partially attributed to the Syrian refugee crisis, …[but] 
Jordan will ultimately have to implement these upgrades and improvements, regardless of 
the presence of refugees.” 160 The reality is that Jordan will always need support from the 
great powers to keep it afloat until its economy can produce the amount of revenue to 
support itself and improving its significant trade imbalance. This was one of the major 
hopes for Jordan that came with the compact as relaxed ROO requirements were 
implemented in the SEZs.  
J. ALL PARTIES GAIN LITTLE FROM THE TRADE INCENTIVE  
Overall, the benefits of a better trade deal with the EU, which Jordan sought, have 
not produced significant results. The relaxed ROO benefit for trade within Jordan to the 
EU, on the conditional Syrian worker requirements, went into effect in July 2016 and by 
April 2017, only six companies had been authorized to export through these new rules.161 
Of those six companies, only two companies had actually started exporting to the EU, and 
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had only brought in EUR 1.6 million.162 Yet by the end of 2017, trade relations were more 
of the same between EU and Jordan. In 2002, trade exports to Jordan by the EU accounted 
for EUR 2 billion and increased by 100% by 2017 with EUR 4.1 billion in that year, while 
Jordan’s exports to the EU went from EUR 314 million in 2002 to 358 million in 2017.163 
Not even a dent had been made in the major trade imbalance. By March 2018, minimal 
progress had been made and only 11 companies had been approved to participate in the 
relaxed ROO endeavor.164 Surprisingly in the midst of this failure Jordan asked for a better 
deal, and the EU agreed to it in order to try to achieve its aims of having more significant 
progress with the employment of Syrian refugees. The new deal allowed for the lifting of 
stringent ROO requirements until 2030 within all Jordanian territory and not just limited 
to 18 SEZs, but Jordan would have to commit to having 60,000 actively employed Syrians 
and to waive all cost for applying for a work permit.165 The EU made their trade deal 
substantially more beneficial for Jordan, but Jordan has yet to capitalize on this opportunity 
for economic growth. The EU reported in June 2019 that there are eight companies 
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approved to export, but only two companies are successfully exporting to the EU.166 The 
hope of Jordan really does depend on it being able to transform itself into an economy that 
can at least start to close the gap on its large trade imbalance. The lack of trade growth is 
directly connected to a lack of job growth for the Syrian refugees, and therefore livelihood 
improvements have been minimal. 
K. MINIMAL GAINS IN REFUGEE LIVELIHOOD OPPORTUNITIES  
The revolutionary ideas and massive amounts of money that surrounded this 
compact assured the world that Syrian livelihoods would increase. Has it increased in some 
way? It has increased, but only a little. In the beginning, there was some progress in the 
effort to produce jobs for Syrians and Jordanians through the incentivized trade deal. In 
2016 and 2017 over 36 thousand work permits were issued each year and there were 233 
Syrian refugees employed in specified SEZs.167 In 2018, there had been 120,000 work 
permits issued, but only 42,000 were active.168 By the end of January 2020, over 179 
thousand permits had been issued and of them over 40 thousand came from the camps since 
2016.169 The total active permits are not known, but one can only assume they are close to 
30% of the total as was the case in 2018. In June 2019, only 165 Syrians were working in 
the SEZs.170 The explosion of jobs in the SEZs or other manufacturing jobs has not 
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occurred. Most of the jobs are in unskilled labor and many job sectors as previously 
mentioned, are still excluded to the Syrians. They still do not have access to their human 
capital to ensure their livelihood and are still excluded from competing with Jordanians in 
many sectors of the formal market. “There are at least 17 job types or [closed] sectors, 
including engineering, teaching, medicine and many service sector Jobs,” which force the 
majority of Syrians into unskilled labor.171 Without job creation or growth, the labor 
market is a zero-sum game and therefore finding work for Syrians means someone else is 
going to be fired or replaced. In the unskilled labor market, the employers would have to 
replace south Asian migrant workers, but employers often prefer south Asian migrant 
workers over both Syrians and Jordanians.172 Jordan is also seeking to create jobs by 
simply formalizing informal labor. Many of the permits that have been given have come 
from this formalization process, but formalization can also have the adverse effect of 
leaving the remainder of Syrian refugees in the informal market to become even more 
exploitable and vulnerable to labor enforcement by the government.173 At the end of the 
day there is a need for more job creation and while Syrians only have limited access to the 
formal labor market, it will be challenging for them to reach 200,000 jobs and create 
significant strides toward greater livelihood.  
Other government policies have had mixed outcomes on Syrian livelihoods. In 
2017, Jordan, “delinked work permits from a single job or employer in the construction 
and agriculture sectors, enabling refugees to have more than one job in addition to enabling 
them to leave an exploitative job” and they also enabled refugees inside the camps to work 
in the formal labor market and apply for work permits.174 Allowing construction and 
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agricultural cooperative agreements that allow Syrians to change jobs without getting a 
new work permit provides them much more labor protection. Yet one of the most valuable 
things about the work permits in addition to working is how it provides mobility to refugees 
who were previously not free to move around the country. Those who get work permits in 
the camps, they can work outside the camp in Jordan and travel freely for up to 30 days.175 
This type of mobility is a major gain for the refugees that reside in the camps. Despite these 
gains, there have been many other policies that have shown that livelihood is a European 
and not a Jordanian priority. In January 2018, Jordan changed the healthcare policy for 
Syrian refugees which made them pay 80% of the foreigner’s rate, which has increased 
their healthcare costs and further limited their self-reliance and livelihood.176 Syrian’s 
livelihood has improved a little, but for the most part they are still being excluded from 
opportunities to access their human capital or livelihood assets.  
L. EDUCATIONAL GAINS ARE UNCERTAIN FOR HOST NATIONS AND 
REFUGEES 
The Jordan Compact has made some positive impact in terms of education, but 
Jordan was unable to fully absorb all Syrian children. Jordan has set up 209 schools that 
operate with double shifts, and 45 schools in refugee camps.177 They were not able to reach 
the terms of the compact of having 190,000 students enrolled by the end of 2017, but in 
2019 they had 144,000 enrolled.178 The Jordan Compact notes that there were 143,000 
Syrians in the education system in 2015, and therefore it appears as if little progress was 
made in increasing Syrian refugee enrollment.179 There remains approximately 73,000 
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Syrian Refugee children outside of the education system in 2018.180 Also by 2018 Jordan 
has had a decrease by 50% in teacher-student ratios from the 2015–2016 school year, which 
is a major success.181 The most concerning trend is the dropout rate for refugees in Jordan. 
The enrollment of Syrian refugees in Jordan is almost 100% until they are age 11 and then 
it slowly decreases.182 By age 16, rates are at 39% only to drop to 13% by age 18.183 In 
addition to significant dropout rates as children get older, the amount of higher education 
for Syrians is significantly low: “Two to five per cent of Syrian refugees aged 18 to 22 
attend post-secondary education, compared to 24 to 46 per cent of Jordanians in this age 
group.”184 Education remains one of the most important areas of concern for Jordan and 
Syrian refugees, and there is still a lot of work to do to ensure their future success.  
M. CONCLUSION 
In December 2018, Jordan and the EU renegotiated the Jordan Compact until 
2020.185 In 2019, the pledging conferences led to another 7 billion promised in support of 
the Syrian cause. As mentioned, Jordan will maintain its relaxed ROO requirements in all 
of Jordan until 2030.186 Indeed, Jordan was revalidated as a country that matters to the EU. 
It is going to continue to receive aid as long as migration is a concern to Europe. The 
memory in the EU of the massive refugee crisis of 2015 and the EU’s ongoing issues with 
migration will make Jordan relevant for years to come. As said before “win-win” is not the 
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correct phrase for the Jordan Compact. However, there have been mutual gains. It is unclear 
how much the EU has decreased migration to its territory through the Jordan Compact. On 
the other hand, there was significant developmental growth for Jordan through it taking 
ownership of the refugee crisis and the great amount of aid received from the international 
community after signing the compact. There have been some gains for the refugees to 
include agriculture and construction cooperative agreements and some being able to work 
in the formal labor market. However, overall, the Syrian refugees are still largely excluded 
from their livelihood assets. The Host nation had hope of significant economic 
improvement that through relaxed ROO trade incentives, but that hope has yet to be 
realized. The Jordan Compact is definitely not a success, but it is a start. The hope is that 
the EU will enforce standards to improve the overall livelihood for Syrian refugees to a 
higher level. Accountability measures need to be developed. Overall, Jordan has taken its 
share of the world’s lemons. The EU does not like lemons, and so they provide the sugar 
to anyone who wants to make lemonade. Jordan’s lemonade is the Jordan Compact. Jordan 
continues to ask for more and more sugar. They will always emphasize how sour these 
lemons are, but the EU keeps dishing out more and more sugar. Until some accountability 
measures are put in place, this lemonade will have lots of lemons, lots of sugar, but still 
will not taste quite right.  
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IV. THE EU-AFGHANISTAN JOINT WAY FORWARD 
AGREEMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Afghanistan has been in nearly constant conflict for over 40 years, from 1979–
2020. With every episode of war, conflict and the subsequent regime change that ensued, 
refugees have fled the country. At times, negotiations brought hope that Afghanistan’s 
conflicts were over, and refugees returned only to find disappointment in an enduring 
conflict. This era of conflict has greatly weakened Afghanistan’s economy and society as 
it resulted in “two million dead, 700,000 widowed and orphaned . . . about one million 
Afghan children raised in refugee camps outside Afghanistan,” and over five million 
Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran.187 Is there a solution that could stem the tide of 
migration back and forth from Afghanistan, promote an environment that allows refugees 
to return, benefit the state, and help the existing communities?  
The UNHCR and other members of the international refugee regime previously 
advocated for bold new solutions to address returns to a country of origin (COO). However, 
in 2016, the EU made the first attempt to operationalize the belief that the international 
regime can stem the tide of refugees by negotiating an incentive package for a country of 
origin. The EU-Afghanistan Joint Way Forward Agreement (JWF) is a non-binding 
readmission agreement that seeks cooperation from the Government of Afghanistan to 
allow for the return of Afghan refugees, while the EU promises an incentive package to 
benefit the government, existing communities, and returnees through reintegration efforts 
and job creation opportunities. It also aims to decrease further migration of Afghan 
refugees outside the region of origin and specifically decrease migration toward Europe.  
The simple question is, has the JWF plan produced mutual gains for all? This 
chapter argues that the JWF does not ultimately benefit returnees into Afghanistan due to 
the negative impacts of repatriation into a country that is not stable economically or 
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security-wise. This chapter also argues that the EU has not overwhelming gained either 
due to the secretive nature of the negotiations and the outcry by many in the international 
community. This chapter further argues that while the Government of the Islamic Republic 
of Afghanistan (GIRoA) has benefited from this relationship to pursue national priorities, 
the host nation communities have only benefited minimally.  
To support this argument, this chapter reviews the history of conflict over the past 
40 years and the overall economic and security setting of the country up to the time of the 
EU-Afghanistan agreements in 2016. The Afghan government’s attempt at taking 
ownership of the refugee situation is addressed as a critical development. The chapter 
explains the secretive nature of the negotiations of the JWF and details of the agreement. 
It also presents an analysis of the post-agreement economic and security situation faced by 
the returnees. To summarize, this chapter demonstrates how the JWF has produced 
minimal gains for existing communities, returnees, and the EU while GIRoA has greatly 
benefited from the deal.  
B. EUROPE’S AFGHAN MIGRATION PROBLEM AND SOLUTION 
Afghanistan became increasingly more important to the EU as they sought to 
control their refugee crisis in 2015. Afghan refugees were on the EU’s radar because they 
were the second highest group of irregular migrants, at over 267 thousand entering the EU 
in 2015, second only to Syrian refugees.188 In 2015, the EU identified that the expiring 
legal rights of 1.2 million undocumented Afghan refugees in Pakistan was a “key concern” 
because of it possibly leading to a new wave of Afghan migration into Europe.189 
Therefore, the EU had to address the existing Afghan migration problem and the potential 
Afghan migration to Europe. The rates of first-time asylum seekers of Afghan refugees in 
the EU went up from 22,000 in 2014 to 181,000 in 2015, and then to 186,000 in 2016, due 
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to the flight out of Pakistan and continued flight out of Afghanistan.190 As a consequence, 
EU sought to support member states by creating a readmission agreement with Afghanistan 
to ensure the cooperation of Afghanistan for any migrant that was not granted asylum. This 
agreement came to be known as the JWF. In order to analyze the JWF and determine how 
it impacted returnees, the host communities, and GIRoA, an understanding of the economic 
and security setting of the country is needed.  
C. (PRE-JWF) THE SECURITY SETTING PRESENTS CHALLENGES FOR 
RETURN OF AFGHAN REFUGEES 
The setting of Afghanistan is important to understand because experts, such as Katy 
Long mentioned earlier, clearly articulate that repatriation can be extremely damaging 
when the proper political, communal, and security conditions are not established.191 She 
further states that many host countries, donors, and countries of origins often have 
incentives to execute repatriation pre-maturely. These issues were all identified under the 
old refugee regime, and the promise of the EU in executing the ideas of the GCR was that 
it was going to ensure mutual gains for all. If the EU was to be successful in implementing 
new strategies regarding repatriation, the environment had to be right.  
However, the history of conflict and migration in Afghanistan in recent years have 
shaped its environment. In the late 1970s, Afghanistan faced an internal conflict after a 
coup by Afghanistan’s communist party, the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan 
(PDPA) overthrew the government of Mohammad Daoud Khan. An Afghan insurgent 
force, the mujahedeen, launched a fight against the regime using Pakistan as a base. The 
situation worsened when the Soviet Union invaded to support the Communist Party in 
1979. The Soviet invasion pushed many people to seek refuge as the country turned into a 
war zone, with villages destroyed, minefields scattered across the country, and the 
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population inflicted with indiscriminate aerial bombardments, torture, mass killings, and 
summary arrests.192  
The mujahideen, supported by the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, 
prevailed against the Soviet occupation. By 1980, this conflict had created 1.9 million 
refugees, the “biggest single group of refugees in the world.”193 Overall the Afghan-Soviet 
war led to 6.2 million refugees in Iran and Pakistan by the end of the 1980s, which was 
approximately half of all the refugees in the world at that time.194 Eventually, the Soviets 
withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989. 
In 1992 the mujahideen had taken over Afghanistan. With the hope that peace had 
been won by the mujahedeen in 1992, millions of refugees returned to Afghanistan but the 
civil war among the mujahideen vying for power caused the repatriation to slowdown.195 
As it continued, the violent and destructive civil war generated more refugees.196 In the 
midst of a chaotic and war weary people, the Taliban arrived in the country in 1994, 
perceived by the populace as a force that could bring stability and peace.197 The Taliban 
were able to take arms away from the people, stop tribal fighting, and open roadways for 
trade, which once again brought a false sense of security as some refugees began to return 
again to Afghanistan.198 By 1996 the Taliban gained control of Kabul and created an 
Islamic Emirate, and implemented a draconian form of sharia law. In 1992, 1.5 million 
refugees returned to Afghanistan, but by the time the Taliban took full power, returns 
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declined to the lowest number in five years, 52,000, in 1997 due to Taliban’s tough rule.199 
Refer to Table 1, Forty Years of Conflict, Migration, and Displacement, for the numbers 
of returns and displaced persons in Afghanistan from 1989 to 2019.  
 
199 Reference Table 1. 
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Table 1. Forty Years of Conflict, Migration, and Displacement200 
 
After the Taliban regime fell in 2001 with the United States’ invasion, once again 
the hope for a new peaceful existence in Afghanistan led over 2.1 million to return in 2002 






 Total Returns Event IDPs 
1988-89 - - 200,000 * Soviet Withdrawal - 
1990 - - 150,000*  6,000,000+ 
1991 - - 200,000*  - 
1992 - - 1,568,000* Mujahideen overthrow PDPA - 
1993 - - 964,000*  15,000 
1994 - - 330,000*  332,200 
1995 - - 348,000*  159,600 
1996 - - 135,000* Taliban overthrow Mujahideen Govt 273,840 
1997 - - 52,000*  296,795 
1998 - - -  315,800 
1999     258,625 
2000     758,625 
2001     1,200,000 
2002 311,491 1,834,537 2,146,028 Taliban defeated by U.S./NATO 665,156 
2003 169,740 475,639 645,379  184,269 
2004 116,079 761,122 877,201  159,549 
2005 237,412 514,090 751,502  142,505 
2006 248,065 139,804 387,869 Taliban insurgency increases attacks 129,310 
2007 163,262 365,410 528,672  153,718 
2008 82,670 278, 484 361,154  230,670 
2009 - 54,552 54,552  297,129 
2010 - 112,968 112,968  351,907 
2011 - 67,962 67,962  447,547 
2012 - 94,556 94,556  486,298 
2013 - 38,766 38,766  631,286 
2014 554,121 16,995 571,116  805,409 
2015 670,210 58,460 728,670  1,174,306 
2016 692,866 372,577 1,065,463 EU-AFG JWF and CAPD 670,532 
2017 560,552 58,817 619,369 EU- AFG Strategy 445,335 
2018 820,000* 15,699 835,699 AFG joins CRRF 343,341 
2019 504,977* 8,079 447,097 Taliban insurgency continues 422,661 
* only Pakistan and Iran returns  
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2002 to 2005 when over 4.4 million refugees returned.202 Despite a quick initial defeat of 
the Taliban in 2001, Afghanistan has been unable to break out of the cycle of conflict. As 
the United States sought to build a democracy in Afghanistan, the Taliban regrouped and 
launched an insurgency that is still going on. By 2006, the insurgency was fully operational, 
and by January to May 2006 there was a 200% increase in attacks compared to the same 
period of time in 2005.203 This rise in conflict also correlated to approximately a 50% drop 
in returns from 2005 to 2006.204  
Yet despite there being no significant reason for hope, repatriation has continued. 
From 2006 to the signing of the JWF in 2015, over four million refugees have returned.205 
These returns despite the perpetuation of conflict which included major civilian casualties. 
In 2015, the Taliban’s control of Afghan territory was expanding, and civilian casualties 
were at their highest since the war started in 2001.206 During the first four-year period after 
the invasion, from 2002 to 2005, there was an average of 373 civilians killed every year 
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but, in the four-year period from 2012 to 2015, an average of 3,246 civilians were killed 
each year.207 Civilian casualties reached over 8,500 in 2016 alone.208  
Afghanistan had been in near constant conflict since the late 1970s and in 2016 it 
was still at war. The civilian population was especially at risk. It was in this environment 
that the EU began to negotiate with Afghanistan for the return of illegal Afghan migrants 
in the EU. The environment in Afghanistan was unsuitable for the repatriation of 
vulnerable migrants not only due to the poor security situation but also due to the declining 
economy.  
D. (PRE-JWF) THE ECONOMIC SETTING PRESENTS CHALLENGES 
FOR RETURN OF AFGHAN REFUGEES 
Mass refugee return comes with a host of economic challenges that are exacerbated 
by the problems of a growing population and an economy heavily reliant on the drug and 
arms trade. Afghanistan’s economy was weak and unable to support its populace, and there 
was little to no economic or state capacity to support returning refugees. Unfortunately, the 
influx of aid after the U.S. invasion only masked the country’s real economic problems. 
Afghanistan’s GDP growth increased to 21% in 2009 due to foreign aid, but then declined 
rapidly to a level at or below three percent from 2014 onward.209 As economic growth 
slowed due to reductions in foreign aid, the supply in the labor market far outweighed 
demand, causing poverty to increase. Studies show that approximately 400 thousand new 
jobs need to be created each year in Afghanistan for the economy to support its growing 
population.210 Afghanistan’s labor market was already overburdened prior to the 
repatriation of foreign refugees, and returnees further strained the already stagnant labor 
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market.211 The World Bank confirms that job creation was overmatched by population 
growth, and finding a good job was difficult.212 Poverty rates went from 33% in 2007 to 
54% in 2016.213  
The burden of returnees on the state and local communities is partly responsible for 
the steadily decreasing stability of Afghanistan. Ahmadi Belquis and Sadaf Lakhani 
explain that the devastating impacts of returnees are straining “government services, 
inhibiting development progress, and exacerbating instability.”214 They show that these 
returnees mainly settle in urban areas, which strains the government’s ability to deliver 
services and provide security. Additionally, their research reveals that conflict over land is 
rampant, and the scarcity of arable land is responsible for rising food insecurity in 
Afghanistan.215 Their report also specifies that conflict among existing communities and 
returnees is common due to the strain on resources. Throughout the period from 2002 to 
2016, local communities dealt with competition for economic and natural resources while 
the state lacked the capacity to absorb this influx of returnees given its persistent economic 
challenges. 
This poor economic environment and lack of capacity by the state exacerbates 
displacement and internal conflict. Studies show that once the limit of capacity is reached 
in an area, conflict becomes more likely and higher insecurity results.216 One indicator of 
absorption capacity limits is the generation of an internally displaced person (IDP). After 
refugees return to their country, they often are unable to settle but remain internally 
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displaced. After 2002, as the conflict became worse in Afghanistan, the chances of further 
displacement as an IDP or remigration increased.217 Returnees in 2013 were twice as likely 
to become internally displaced as those in 2002, but what made this even worse was that 
returnees were 50 times more numerous in 2013.218 This indicates that the country’s ability 
to absorb return is over its limit.219 Indeed, the IDP situation has worsened with time as 
there was an average of 153,820 IDPs a year from the five-year period from 2003 to 2007, 
while the five-year period from 2012 to 2016 had on average 753,566 a year.220 Indeed, 
IDPs only further exacerbate the problem of return migration and are a symptom and a 
cause of the poor economic and security conditions. IDPs further reflect the fight for 
resources from the existing community and returnees. This fight for resources can also be 
seen in the livelihoods of returnees.  
The returnees’ ability to seek livelihood opportunities is an indicator of how well 
they can integrate back into society. Focusing on economic opportunities is helpful to 
determine returnees’ livelihood prospects. An ILO study assessed the livelihood 
opportunities in 22 areas of high return in Afghanistan in 2013.221 The ILO assessment 
provided an important overview of the accessibility of livelihood opportunities for 
returnees. The study found that returnee families had to find any job quickly to ensure 
family survival, which usually meant low-skilled labor in the informal labor market. The 
research pointed out that the informal labor market has significant risks for returnees such 
as reduced or no pay for work, safety hazards, child labor, drug abuse, and other labor 
rights concerns. The ILO study showed that reintegration programs attempted to improve 
the labor market in high return areas where economic opportunities were low, but that 
overall “livelihood programme-supported jobs were extremely badly paid and often 
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unsustainable.”222 To find better work, returnees had to leave the over-saturated high 
return areas and seek work in urban centers or even travel to other nations.  
Even though returnees are moving into cities, or urban areas, most are not working 
in the formal labor market. The ILO study also shows that the best jobs are in the formal 
sector, such as being police officers and schoolteachers, because they provide a constant 
flow of money, whereas the informal market only produces seasonal cash flows. 
Additionally, the next best jobs are in small business, with the third and least desirable jobs 
being in agriculture. However, most returnees have little access to the desirable formal 
labor market and work as low-skilled labor in the informal economy. The ILO study further 
explains that returnee families often rely on non-governmental interest-free loans that 
provide a crucial safety net. Returnees come back to Afghanistan and have limited 
livelihood opportunities. They try to survive in the informal economy, and often their safety 
net comes from their personal connections rather than the government.  
E. (PRE-JWF) RETURN PROCESS AND GIROA’S OWNERSHIP OF 
RETURN MIGRATION 
GIRoA and other international organizations’ have sought to provide for the 
livelihoods and security for returnees. However, GIRoA has largely been ineffective at 
managing the return of so many Afghans. For years it relied on and followed the lead of 
international organizations. In 2015, there was a major shift in the approach of GIRoA and 
it started taking national ownership of the situation. Understanding how GIRoA operated 
and this shift toward greater leadership is essential to understand when considering the 
negotiation and future implementation of the JWF in 2016.  
The UNHCR, in partnership with GIRoA, primarily works with registered refugees, 
while the International Organization for Migration (IOM), in partnership with the 
government, primarily works with undocumented refugees returning. In order to determine 
the scope of reintegration efforts it is important to understand the process of return. The 
Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation’s (MoRR) Comprehensive Voluntary Repatriation 
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and Reintegration Strategy (CVRRS) for 2015 articulates the process of return at that 
time.223 The CVRRS calls for registered refugees to visit an UNHCR Voluntary 
Repatriation Center in the host country to coordinate their return; upon return they will 
visit an Encashment Center (EC) where each returnee receives USD $200 to cover their 
immediate reintegration needs, such as transportation. Therefore, a family of five would 
receive $1000. Additionally, the CVRRS explains that ECs also provide counseling and 
education services to prepare returnees for reintegration: this includes courses in mine risk 
education, information about reintegration into schools, basic health services to include 
vaccinations, and the identification of any vulnerable persons or groups that need additional 
services. Overall, the ECs provide a valuable service designed to ease the transition of 
documented refugee families back into their home country.  
The CVRS also explains the process for undocumented returnees who may be 
returning voluntarily or by force. They are identified at border crossing points and then 
taken to a transit center. They are screened for health. The government works with 
unaccompanied minors to connect them with family. The CVRSS also specifies that for 
those vulnerable groups, some transportation may be provided as well as a one-time 
allocation of food and other essentials, such as blankets, cookware, and hygiene items. The 
strategy document also goes on to say that “provision of housing and other services 
required for reintegration is not possible for undocumented deportees who lack 
documentation.”224 Documented returnees have a significant advantage in receiving 
reintegration support upon return, which is especially concerning when considering that in 
2015 undocumented returns were over 700 thousand, and in 2016 they increased to over 
one million.225 The minimal reintegration support for undocumented returnees further 
decreases their livelihood opportunities, and they become even more vulnerable than 
documented refugees.   
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The MoRR was a less than pro-active leader, and more of a follower of international 
organizations such as the UNHCR. Up to 2016, GIRoA did not take ownership of the 
migration situation because of poor leadership within the MoRR. Until 2016, MoRR was 
the primary accountable organization for returnees and IDPs, but it also consulted with 
other Afghan ministries, donors, UN agencies, and NGOs.226 The first major plan to 
address solutions for returnees was not led by MoRR, but led by the UNHCR in 2012, and 
called Solution Strategies for Afghan Refugees (SSAR). MoRR did not take national 
ownership over the Afghan response but continued to follow UNHCR’s lead. Without 
ownership and leadership of the migration crisis in Afghanistan, the power of the state and 
its resources were not effectively used to help refugees and help the nation address the 
impacts of mass return.  
MoRR was not effective at leading the UNHCR-developed plans, and these plans 
were not integrated into GIROA’s national priorities and agenda. A report by the Special 
Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) in 2015 highlighted the 
dysfunction and poor leadership of the MoRR that hindered the state from being able to 
drive national agendas and development.227 The SIGAR report detailed how MoRR’s high 
levels of corruption caused the government’s land allocation scheme to be implemented 
haphazardly and ineffectively. The report explained that the land allocation program 
provided land to returnees and was a key component of the SSAR. The SIGAR also 
revealed that relationships between the UNHCR and IOM were strained due to endemic 
corruption and poor leadership within the MoRR. It further argued that the MoRR was 
unable to ensure refugees were implemented into the national development strategies and 
programs in other ministries, and that the MoRR did not advocate for the needs of the 
refugees. The report found that the MORR hindered the execution of the published and 
agreed upon strategies by the international community to help refugees and returnees in 
 
226 Katrin Marchand and Melissa Siegel et al. “Afghanistan Migration Profile,” IOM, Kabul, 
Afghanistan, 2014, https://afghanistan.iom.int/sites/default/files/Reports/afghanistan_migration_profile.pdf, 
218. 
227 “15-83-Audit Report: Afghan Refugees and Returnees: Corruption and Lack of Afghan Ministerial 
Capacity Have Prevented Implementation of a Long-term Refugee Strategy,” SIGAR, August 2015, 
https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/SIGAR-15-83-AR.pdf.  
68 
Afghanistan.228 Returning refugees were not a major priority, and the state relied on 
foreign international actors to help drive their policies through the SSAR.  
However, in 2015 GIROA altered the way it approached the return migration 
situation, indicating that it was prepared to lead the approach rather than follow in order to 
incorporate migration into its national agenda. GIRoA restructured its national approach 
and coordination for return migration by creating a government body called the High 
Commission for Migration (HCM). This was a critical step for Afghanistan for this 
commission became controlled by the president and consisted of all the line ministers, and 
it provided an avenue for the president to make decisions concerning refugees, returnees, 
and IDPs.229 The sub-committee of the HCM, led by the chief executive and the line 
ministers, implemented the decisions of the HCM.230 This new structure provided a way 
to ensure migration concerns were being implemented into national strategies and plans. 
Other indicators that GIRoA was taking more ownership was that in August 2015 the state 
produced The Comprehensive Voluntary Repatriation and Reintegration Strategy, which 
was essentially in line with the SSAR but outlined their approach to achieve national 
goals.231 In December GIRoA also produced a national policy document entitled, Self-
Reliance: A Strategy for Reducing Informal Out-Migration and Reintegrating the People 
Who Have Left, which focused on four priorities: improving the civil service, housing 
development, legal migrant labor, and rural growth and integration in the labor market.232 
In 2016, GIRoA made even more changes that showed that migration was a national 
priority.  
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In 2016, GIRoA created a new body, the Displacement and Return Executive 
Committee (DiREC), to direct migration issues in a more efficient way to be able to have 
better control and power regarding interactions with the international community, 
especially when it came to aid. Three bodies were created to oversee migration policy and 
implementation: the HCM that defines policy, the HCM sub-committee comprising the 
decision makers, and DiREC which executes the policy.233 DiREC is led by joint 
representatives from the Office of the Chief Executive, MoRR, and the United Nations 
Assistance Mission to Afghanistan.234 Those included in the DiREC are officials from “the 
Office of the President, the OCE, MoRR, UNAMA, the National Security Council, the 
Ministry of Finance, the Office of the State Minister for Disaster Management and 
Humanitarian Affairs, ARAZI, the World Bank, UNHCR, IOM and OCHA” that comprise 
a policy, a technical, and a financial support group.235 This new structure represents the 
implementation of a whole of government approach and ensures that returnees will not be 
forgotten or unsupported because of a single weak ministry such as the MoRR. This 
internal government restructuring allowed them to be able to utilize development aid and 
allow it to achieve national goals. It is no coincidence that in October 2016 at the Brussels 
Conference on Afghanistan, a pledging conference, that GIRoA presented its national 
agenda entitled, The Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework 2017–2021 
(ANDPF). Afghanistan was prepared to show the world that it had a development plan and 
an organizational framework designed to effectively utilize the aid brought in from the 
pledging conference to pursue national goals and agendas.  
F. DECREASING AID AND AN OPPORTUNITY 
The year 2014 found Afghanistan in deep economic decline, and migration replaced 
security as the primary incentive to encourage outside nations to pledge money, especially 
with the EU. When U.S. and NATO forces made known their plan to withdraw troops in 
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2014 there was a belief by GIRoA that aid “would increase to mitigate the negative effects 
of the withdrawal of international security forces, it instead declined sharply.” 236 World 
Bank data shows that between 2001 to 2009 official foreign development aid into 
Afghanistan increased, driving a corresponding increase in Afghanistan’s economic 
growth. However, as foreign aid began to decline after 2009, Afghanistan’s economic 
growth also faltered.237 By the end of 2014 the inflow of foreign aid was at a seven-year 
low, and the economy was at a ten-year low.238 The aid that came along with the war effort 
was now unreliable and decreasing. However, GIRoA found a way to mitigate some of 
these problems by requesting more aid and building economic relationships for the purpose 
of migration. 
The desire to acquire additional aid by using migration concerns can be seen in 
GIRoA’s request for support for reintegration efforts since 2012. In 2012 UNHCR and 
GIRoA asked for 227 million as part of a reintegration program.239 In 2014, GIRoA  again 
asked for international support, claiming that it had financial requirements of $189 
million.240 The 2014 SSAR declared that a “reinvigorated, multi-year support of the 
international community [was]  essential to ensure successful implementation of the 
Solutions Strategy and . . . also as a joint investment in stability and security in Afghanistan 
and beyond.”241 First, GIRoA made the argument that money would not only help the 
refugee situation but also the security situation, which the world desperately desired. The 
SSAR also claimed that “more efforts are needed to align the development processes . . . 
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prioritize full reintegration of returnees into the Afghan society and ensure inclusion of 
returnee related activities into national development planning and programmes.”242 
Second, the SSAR argued that aid funding would be utilized to improve national 
development in the country in addition to reintegrating returnees in society. Lastly, the 
SSAR appealed for additional money to promote regional security and stability, 
reintegration of refugees, and development to decrease the burden on the state and existing 
communities. GIRoA hoped this new approach would bring in more aid and stop the 
decreasing aid from the international community.  
The 2015–2016 SSAR found GIRoA with a better organizational structure and a 
better ability to pursue national priorities, and the requested amount of international aid 
increased to 553 million.243 This represented a threefold increase when compared to the 
budget request in 2014. Yet, Afghanistan was not simply trying to increase aid to build its 
national resilience, it also wanted better economic relationships with others. For example, 
since 2015, Pres. Ghani had been seeking economic partnership and specifically a 
Cooperation Agreement for Partnership and Development (CAPD) with the EU, which 
would “provide the legal framework for the EU’s long-term engagement.”244 The 
opportunity came when the Vice President of the European Commission, Federica 
Mogherini, asked to hold high-level talks on migration in December 2015.245 That month 
a proposal for the CAPD went before the European Council.246 During 2015 the EU was 
in a refugee crisis, and part of that crisis concerned Afghan refugees. It was during this 
time that Afghanistan overhauled its government framework to promote the needs of 
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refugees and resiliency of Afghanistan as a whole. Whether GIRoA did this knowingly to 
encourage a deal with the EU is unclear, but regardless the timing was ideal. The 
opportunity came and they were ready.  
G. EU AND GIROA NEGOTIATIONS 
There is scant information available regarding the negotiations of the JWF due to 
the secretive nature of the negotiations. However, despite the secrecy, a leaked document 
from the Council of the European Union in March 2016 gave insight to the purpose behind 
the EU’s efforts to create the JWF.247 The leaked document revealed the driving forces 
behind the agreement and how the EU utilized foreign aid and the CAPD as incentives to 
apply pressure. The leaked document showed the EU was concerned about the possibility 
of further mass migration to Europe due to the worsening situations in Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, and Iran. The document made it clear that, despite contested support for the JWF 
in Afghanistan by government officials, the CAPD and aid was used to pressure Afghan 
officials into supporting the JWF. The leaked document confirmed that readmission 
cooperation was part of the CAPD, but that it had not yet been signed. This suggested that 
Afghanistan needed to support the JWF if it wanted the CAPD to be approved by the 
European Council.  
In addition to suggesting that Afghanistan needed to support the JWF, the document 
also disclosed that European aid was being used as a bargaining chip. The document 
specifically stated that “the State Building Contract for EUR 200 million in preparation is 
intended to be made migration sensitive . . . possibly to the implementation of the Joint 
Way Forward.”248 Next, it addressed the upcoming Brussels Conference in October 2016, 
and said “the leverage of the conference should be used as a positive incentive for the 
implementation of the Joint Way Forward.”249 The leaked document confirmed that aid 
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was planned to be used to pressure GiRoA into signing the JWF. The same document also 
reaffirmed the EU’s desire to create mutual gains for Afghanistan and the EU by building 
Afghanistan’s “resilience against fragility” in order to ensure a “cooperative attitude on 
return.”250 The EU intended to buy cooperation through incentivizing aid and a CAPD for 
returning Afghan refugees. Their hope to create mutual gains appears to be a secondary 
concern.  
The negotiations among Afghan leaders caused discord among the top leadership. 
Jelena Bjelica, a writer for the Afghanistan Analysts Network, is the only writer who has 
written about the negotiations within GIRoA and the events that preceded the signing of 
the JWF. She uncovered how the JWF almost failed due to great opposition by the Afghan 
minister of refugees and repatriation, Sayed Alemi Balkhi, and the Afghan minister of 
foreign affairs, Salahuddin Rabbani.251 Bjelica claimed it was crucial that the JWF was 
signed prior to the Brussels conference, because organizers believed discussing the JWF 
during the conference might pull the focus away from aid, and potentially deter other 
countries from pledging. She specified that the negotiations were slowed by Balki because 
he believed all Afghans should have 100% asylum acceptance, like Syrian refugees. He 
also claimed Afghans often spent their life savings on their migration to Europe and 
returning them would leave them with nothing. Bjelica observed that his concerns gained 
no traction because both the president and the chief executive officer of the unity 
government supported the JWF. Bjelica showed how Rabbani and Balkhi contested the 
JWF by taking the matter to the Afghan parliament, where Rabbani fought to convince the 
GIROA not to be pressured into the deal by promises of European aid. Her report finally 
stated the parliament did not even vote on the matter, and later the Deputy Minister of 
Refugees, a friend to Pres. Ghani, signed the JWF instead of Balkhi. When the Minister of 
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Refugees and Repatriation does not agree with a readmission document that is a red flag, 
but the reality is that the EU wanted this deal and Pres. Ghani wanted the CAPD.  
H. THE JOINT WAY FORWARD AGREEMENT 
The JWF, signed on 2 October 2016, is a non-binding agreement that outlines the 
EU and Afghanistan’s “cooperation on migration” to enable mutual gains for both.252 
Afghanistan agreed to cooperate in the return of Afghan refugees in the EU whose asylum 
requests were rejected in Europe,  while the EU agreed to protect vulnerable groups during 
returns and not to return unaccompanied minors. The two parties agreed to work together 
to ensure that every returnee is provided with travel documentation, and to ensure proper 
coordination for all repatriations. The JWF also states the EU will carry out an information 
campaign within Afghanistan to inform the population on the risks of migration to Europe, 
in an effort to discourage further migration to Europe. The EU agreed to pay the cost of 
travel and provide a reintegration package. The text of the JWF claims that development 
aid is not tied to the agreement, aside from the funding earmarked for the reintegration 
package.253 It specifically states that “return programmes and reintegration assistance are 
separate from and irrespective of the development assistance provided to Afghanistan.”254 
The EU does not want to be seen as pressuring Afghanistan into a readmission agreement 
through large amounts of aid, although the leaked document clearly shows that was their 
intent. 
The JWF further states that the reintegration package has three parts, one for the 
government of Afghanistan, one for the IOM, and one for creating jobs in order to prevent 
irregular migration. Overall these packages are to support reintegration and provide quick 
relief  to host communities and returnees through building capacity in government 
institutions, job training, and skills development.255 Essentially the agreement is a 
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handshake that says that Afghanistan will cooperate when the EU wants to send people 
back voluntarily or by force. The EU sweetens the deal by saying that they are going to 
build the capacity of the government and benefit both returnees and existing community 
members to essentially build livelihoods through economic opportunities. It is a bold deal 
in words, but it does not outline any specific measures or amount of funds that will be used 
to implement the plan. 
I. (POST JWF) SECURITY UPON RETURN: A NET LOSS FOR 
RETURNEES 
Although some of the impacts of the JWF are less clear, the number of returnees 
from Europe is known. Eurostat has data on Third Country Nationals Returned Following 
an Order to Leave.256 This data shows that from 2010 to 2016, the EU on average returned 
3,860 Afghans a year from Europe. In 2017, the first full year of the JWF being in effect, 
4,265 Afghans returned and in 2018, there were 3,120 that returned. Both 2017 and 2018 
saw less than the 2016 returns of 8,335. These numbers show that in terms of returns from 
Europe, the EU did not benefit much at all. The JWF did not provide a significant advantage 
for member states to return more than they did prior to the JWF. Indeed, the EU lost more 
than it gained, because of the negative backlash by the international community regarding 
these returns. 
The international condemnation for the JWF was loud and made clear to the EU. 
The EU is one of the world’s premier advocates for human rights, but the JWF created a 
backlash from the human rights activists. Twenty-six international organizations wrote an 
open letter to the EU on 24 October 2016, entitled, Open Letter: The European Parliament 
must immediately address the Joint Way Forward Agreement between the EU and 
Afghanistan.257 They had multiple problems with the JWF. First, they criticized the 
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agreement as being “a back door agreement…[that was] negotiated covertly,” and therefore 
bypassing the normal avenues to achieve a readmission agreement.258 They further argued 
that the EU’s creation of a non-binding agreement prevented “democratic accountability” 
by averting scrutiny from the European Parliament.259 The letter addressed the concerns 
of using aid to decrease migration, and other concerns such as non-refoulement, the 
protection of children, the poor security environment, and human rights violations. The 
JWF had only been signed earlier in the month, but the EU was put on notice that the 
international community was watching and already not pleased with how it was pursuing 
its goals. Unfortunately, the EU did not curtail the program, but continued to execute 
returns to Afghanistan despite the warnings.  
The international outcry continued as returnees dealt with security and human rights 
violations and the challenges of never having lived in Afghanistan. Security was one of the 
primary reasons for opposition. Amnesty International shows that the EU increased the 
returns by over six thousand from 2015 to 2016 even though during that time there was a 
rise in civilian casualties.260 They highlight a family who left Afghanistan after being 
severely persecuted, and when their asylum case was denied in Europe, they returned home 
only to have their father killed. Penny Koutrolikou has shown in an article some of the 
hypocrisy of the JWF.261 She shows that the UK’s Foreign of Commonwealth Office warn 
all UK citizens against all travel to the majority of Afghanistan, and only essential travel 
to some of the areas, while at the same time the EU returns Afghans to these travel-banned 
areas. She shows the desire to protect citizens but not Afghan migrants. She makes a 
compelling argument regarding whose safety does the EU really protect. The reality is that 
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Afghanistan is not getting more peaceful and the future is unpredictable. In June 2019, the 
Global Peace Index reported that Afghanistan is the “least peaceful country in the world, 
replacing Syria.”262 The president of the International Federation of Human Rights, has 
responded: 
The security situation in Afghanistan is alarming with indiscriminate 
violence… Thousands of civilians continue to be killed, abducted, maimed 
and displaced by the armed conflict. Nobody should be deported there. How 
can the EU pretend that it will respect international law including the 
protection against non-refoulement? Afghanistan is simply not safe.263  
Unfortunately, war and conflict in Afghanistan continue, and the environment is 
not safe for returnees. In addition to violence and security concerns, a problem with many 
of these returns is the returning of vulnerable groups such as children or those who have 
never lived in Afghanistan. Some returnees were born in Iran or Pakistan and migrated to 
the EU but were returned to Afghanistan, a land they never knew. This was the case with 
Taibeh Abbasi, an Afghan girl. Abassi made the news because although she was Afghan, 
she had never lived there, and was been born in Iran and raised in Norway since 2012.264 
Her family’s asylum was rejected in 2013 and in 2019 the government attempted to forcibly 
return her family to Afghanistan.265 In cases such as this, they return with no experience 
of the country and minimal connections. Another major critique of the JWF is that it makes 
it easy to return someone as soon as they turn 18 and meet the threshold of being an 
adult.266 Children feel unsafe during the return process, have challenges reintegrating, and 
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are vulnerable to being targeted by violent organizations.267 Afghanistan simply does not 
have the right environment to enable return and vulnerable populations make this return 
even more dangerous. Indeed, an unknown source may have got it right, when he “called 
the Joint Way Forward a ‘poisoned cup’ that Afghanistan was forced to drink in order to 
receive development aid.” 268 Yet it appears this poison cup may have been drunk by only 
the returnees and the EU. In terms of mutual gains, there was no net gain, but a net loss for 
returnees coming from Europe due to the poor conditions on the ground in Afghanistan.  
J. (POST JWF) ECONOMIC CONDITIONS UPON RETURN: MINIMAL 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR RETURNEES  
In determining the degree to which returnees are benefiting, the livelihood 
opportunities after the signing of the JWF need to be addressed. The Asia Foundation has 
recently published A Survey on Afghan Returnees that details the livelihood challenges of 
returnees and the amount of reintegration support.269 The study shows that 15% receive 
education while in displacement, but 27% reported learning a new skill while in 
displacement. When they returned to Afghanistan, many received some sort of assistance 
to include, “food (41.4%), cash/loans (32.5%), health care (22.0%), housing (21.3%), 
clothes and kitchen materials (17.1%), employment (16.4%), and training (3.5%).”270 The 
assistance by the government still seemed to be marred by corruption. 21% of those who 
sought assistance from the government had to pay a bribe or perform a service to receive 
it.271 Additionally, the study showed the amount of support other organizations gave to 
returnees comparing those who were documented and undocumented, and stated “15.7% 
received support from the UNHCR (versus 5.4% who were undocumented) and 6.9% 
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received support from the IOM (versus 2.6% who were undocumented).”272 Although the 
IOM does not represent the EU, it is the major recipient of the reintegration aid package 
based off the JWF agreement, and therefore shows their scope of support, which is 
minimal. These numbers make sense if the EU is focusing most of their reintegration 
support on those returning from Europe as returns from Europe in 2018 accounted for .3% 
of the overall returns for the year.273 
Could these returnees take their new skills and create a better livelihood post JWF? 
Unfortunately those interviewed for the Asia Foundation study responded that their 
“household financial situation had gotten worse since returning to Afghanistan (53.5%), 
while 29.6% said it had improved and 16.8% said it had remained the same.”274 Also, 
more than 60% of respondents claimed that employment opportunities were better in 
displacement. In terms of economic support, 20% said they received help from friends, 
while 9% received help from the UNHCR and 4% from IOM. Overall, economic 
opportunities appear to decrease for returnees. The economic situation was also impacting 
children’s access to education.  
Education is crucial for future livelihoods of families. However, the study showed 
that 25% of the respondents chose to keep at least one child out of school, and of them 50% 
did so for economic concerns. Looking at the enrollment of girls in school helps explain 
the reasons why some have less access to education. The study shows that in rural areas 
families are less likely to send their girls to school when they have concerns about their 
safety and concerns about their financial situation. The security and economic environment 
in Afghanistan are not suited to send children to school and to produce livelihood 
opportunities for the majority of Afghans as well as for one of the most vulnerable 
populations, the returnees. Overall, livelihood opportunities are not great in Afghanistan 
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and many times it would have been better if the returnees had remained refugees in their 
host country.  
The economic and security environment was not right for repatriation to 
Afghanistan. These lessons were learned in the old regime, but unfortunately the EU and 
Afghanistan did just as Katy Long said many governing bodies would do and force 
repatriation too early for their own gain.275 The returnees were pawns in these political 
games for governing bodies to get what they wanted.  
K. GIROA GREATLY BENEFITS 
GIRoA played the game and won big. The first major benefit for GIRoA from the 
deal was the signing of the CAPD and the creation of the EU and Afghanistan Strategy. It 
is likely that Afghanistan would not have entered into further agreements with the EU had 
it not signed the JWF. However, the CAPD is what they really wanted. The process to 
finalize the CAPD moved forward quickly as it was presented to the Council of the 
European Union the next month in Nov 2016.276 On 18 February 2017, vice president 
Federica Mogherini and the Afghan minister of finance, Eklil Hakimi, signed the CAPD 
less than four months after the signing of the JWF.277 The CAPD is important because it 
is the first legally binding agreement between the EU and Afghanistan.278 The JWF is not 
a legal document, but the CAPD is and it will cement the EU and Afghanistan relationship 
for years to come. The CAPD really creates a comprehensive partnership between the two 
parties for many purposes, but most importantly to support and promote security, 
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development, Afghan institutions, trade, and investment.279 Indeed, the agreement is 
expansive, covering 60 articles or areas where the countries will cooperate, ranging from 
sanitary matters to intellectual property rights to counter-terrorism. The CAPD is more 
beneficial than the JWF for it has specific legal measures that will guarantee benefits to the 
state. For example, this agreement provides most-favored-nation status between the two 
parties, helping both countries get the best deal when it comes to trade. The CAPD 
retroactively places the JWF under a legal framework as it says, “the Parties agree to 
conclude, upon request by either Party, an agreement regulating specific obligations for 
readmission.”280  
In addition to the CAPD, in October 2017 the EU developed a new European Union 
and Afghan Strategy which outlines the new EU and Afghanistan relationship. This 
document lays out specific benefits that are coming to GIRoA due to the new partnership 
relationship it has with the EU.281 The strategy outlines its support for an Afghan-led peace 
process, political and economic regional cooperation, drug and crime prevention, 
democracy, and human rights. It also outlines efforts to support development in the 
country. In regard to development the document explains that the EU has a state building 
contract for Afghanistan worth EUR 200 million for building financial institutions and 
reducing reliance on aid. Additionally, the strategy states that the EU utilizes the Afghan 
Reconstruction Trust Fund to help pursue development goals as aligned with the national 
budget. Some of these development initiatives outlined in the document is the EU-funded 
trade assistance program to support development cooperation regionally and the EUs intent 
to work with the GIRoA on improving their ability to provide services, create jobs, improve 
rural economic prospects, and improve education. Additionally, the document 
acknowledges that the EU is a supporter of Citizen Charter that improves infrastructure 
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and services to approximately 40,000 existing communities over the next decade.282 These 
three documents or agreements establish the base for all EU Afghan relations, and the 
signing of the JWF made this relationship possible.283 
The positive and now enduring relationship with the EU has not been the only 
benefit of GIRoA. First, the promise of money started to rise significantly only days after 
the signing of the JWF at the Brussels Conference on Afghanistan on 4 and 5 October 2016. 
The overall amount of money pledged for Afghanistan during the conference was 15.2 
billion and 5.6 billion of that was pledged by the EU.284 The EU carried over 36% of the 
entire sum. The pressure for aid significantly influenced Afghanistan’s decision to join the 
JWF, and after signing Afghanistan had real hope it was going to reap a great reward. 
World Bank data shows that lending also significantly increased in the years following 
2015.285 Their data shows that lending went from 270 million USD in 2015 to 717 million 
USD in 2016, and that the average from 2017 to 2019 was 500 million USD. The World 
Bank data also shows that Afghanistan was able to stop their declining GDP and essentially 
not fall below 2016 numbers. Overall, in Sep 2019 the EU claimed it had spent or allocated 
1.4 billion EUR in development aid and 240 million EUR in funding to support “migration 
and forced displacement.”286 In some ways this new money was preserving the status quo, 
but there is no doubt that the Afghan Government really benefitted by the creation of the 
long-term relationship with the EU and by improving their aid situation. The real 
opportunity for Afghanistan was that it could now utilize these new funds to achieve 
national priorities outlined in the ANDPF and more effectively manage and support 
reintegration efforts to help returnees and existing communities.  
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L. REINTEGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS: A WIN FOR 
EXISTING COMMUNITIES AND RETURNEES? 
Understanding the impact on existing communities and returnees as direct 
beneficiaries from the JWF is somewhat challenging due to its secretive nature. Many 
reports are vague, but there is some evidence that communities and returnees benefited. 
The EU-Strategy simply states that in accordance with the JWF, 79 million EUR was 
allocated to support existing communities.287 In relation to refugees and IDPs, the 
document says that it supports Afghan refugees in Iran and Pakistan, and 200,000 IDPs in 
Afghanistan through efforts to support the regional SSAR. It goes on to say that it supports 
“health, education, legal protection and legal assistance, sanitation and hygiene as well as 
livelihood opportunities.”288 Additionally, the EU has acknowledged that it allocated 27 
million EUR to support communities that have a high amount of displaced persons in order 
to help create jobs and economic prospects.289 In terms of regional support since 2016, the 
EU stated that it has provided 300 million EUR to Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Iran and 
Iraq for refugees and reintegration purposes, and that through that aid they were able to 
help “70,000 individuals with community development, vocational training, and boosting 
small enterprises.”290 By the end of 2017 all reintegration programs were established and 
in operation.291 By December 2018, the EU had provided reintegration support for 406 
returnees, which included “medical and psycho-social support, onward transportation to 
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the final destination and temporary accommodation.” 292 Another report indicated that the 
reintegration package was only for those returnees who came from Europe and not for those 
repatriated from other countries such as Pakistan and Iran.293 The EU has allocated 
millions of dollars to support existing communities, IDPs, and has self-reported that it has 
helped thousands of Afghan community members and returnees. This reporting by the EU 
shows that there was gains by the existing community and returnees, but the details and 
amount of gain is difficult to monitor or observe.  
The JWF articulates that it provides an aid package to the IOM, and evidence 
suggests that the Reintegration Assistance and Development for Afghanistan (RADA) is 
the program that the EU is funding as part of this aid package. RADA is a program run by 
the IOM that is funded by the EU. The project has a budget of EUR 30 million and is 
planned to be in operation from 2017–2021.294 The IOM reports that the program is in 
eight provinces and hopes to support 30,000 Afghans.295 Additionally, RADA aims to 
build government capacity, execute community development, provide grants to local 
businesses, conduct job training, and provide reception assistance to returnees from 
Europe.296 The document states all returned under JWF will have instant support once they 
land at the airport in Kabul, Afghanistan.297 IOM reports that RADA is aligned with 
DiREC and the ANDPF.298 As of 2018, RADA had completed 4 community development 
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projects and had 11 ongoing, helping 4,745 households.299 IOM further stated that it had 
made agreements with 13 businesses to help promote business development which 
safeguarded 155 jobs. It also stated that it had helped 4795 with reception assistance to 
include 426 with temporary accommodation and 4623 with transportation.  
As part of RADA there is Technical and Vocational Education and Training 
(TVET) provided in the eight different regions. In 2018, 230 returnees were selected to 
participate in this program, and learned skills in one of the following: “embroidery, mobile 
repairing, solar panel repairing, curtain making, child bedding tailoring, dress making and 
coat making tailoring.” 300 Each participant was given a set of tools to develop their craft 
and then upon completion of the program they were given the tools to keep in order to 
allow them to continue to use their newfound skills.301 In 2019, 528 more were selected 
to receive TVET training.302 Overall, the EU has provided reintegration assistance and 
helped both returnees, IDPs, and communities. Individuals and families across Afghanistan 
are benefiting from the money the EU is providing to the IOM and other developmental 
projects. RADA appears to have good results in particular. Returnees and existing 
communities are receiving mutual gain, but those being helped are still only a small 
percentage compared to the extreme numbers of returnees.  
M. THE PERPETUATION OF THE JWF AND THE EU’S TURKISH 
CONNECTION  
EU’s credibility was stained by their efforts to push forward the JWF. They admit 
wrongdoing. In 5 April 2017, they acknowledge that they should have been more 
transparent, but then encourages the member states “to speed up current administrative and 
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judicial procedures” to address the Afghan problem.303 This was a soft apology with full 
support of continued repatriation. Yet it was not until later that year that a full apology and 
denouncement of the JWF took place. On December 14, 2017, the EU recorded this 
statement as part of a Parliament Resolution:  
Notes the conclusion of the Joint Way Forward informal readmission 
agreement between the EU and Afghanistan; regrets the lack of 
parliamentary oversight and democratic control on the conclusion of this 
agreement; calls on governments in the region to refrain from the 
repatriation of Afghans; points out that this is a direct violation of 
international humanitarian law and that the increasing number of refugees 
being treated this way only lends strength to terrorist groups and creates 
more instability in the region; underlines that repatriations to Afghanistan 
put the lives of returnees at grave risk, in particular those of single persons 
without a network of family or friends in Afghanistan who stand little 
chance of survival; underlines that EU assistance and cooperation must be 
tailored to achieving development and growth in third countries and to 
reducing and eventually eradicating poverty, and not to incentivizing third 
countries to cooperate on readmission of irregular migrants, to forcibly 
deterring people from moving, or to stopping flows to Europe.304  
Despite the EU admitting that it needed to be more transparent, that all returns 
should stop, and that they violated international humanitarian law, the EU has not changed. 
Transparency is still not provided for the JWF. Many documents regarding the JWF on the 
EUs database are still not available for public consumption. To the knowledge of the 
author, the JWF still has not been debated and put up for revision to the EU Parliament. 
Despite their rhetoric, the returns continued with 3,120 in 2018 as mentioned before. Why 
does the EU continue to execute returns despite understanding the negative effect? 
Still, Afghans continue to be a major group seeking asylum in Europe and Turkey. 
The continued migration flows to Europe and Turkey keep the EU fully engaged in 
executing the JWF. Afghanistan remains the top nationality of people seeking asylum in 
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Europe in 2019.305 Many Afghans are getting detained in Turkey in this process, while the 
Turkish government announced plans in May 2019 that it was planning on returning 100 
thousand Afghans by the end of 2019.306 This relationship with the EU and Turkey is 
important to understand. The EU has made more significant deals with Turkey regarding 
immigration than maybe any other country. Turkey is crucial to the EU’s plan to deter 
migration coming into the EU. For example, a Turkish official has claimed that in 2019 
Turkey has stopped approximately 270 thousand migrants from entering the EU.307 In 
order to ensure Turkey’s continued cooperation, since mid-2018,the EU has extended JWF 
reintegration assistance to Afghans who are returned by Turkey.308 In the first 5 months 
of 2019, Turkey sent over 20 thousand Afghan migrants back to Afghanistan.309 The EU 
will continue repatriation of Afghans as it still sees them as a major problem, but the 
Turkey- EU relationship will ensure the JWF remains in force. As the EUs repatriation of 
Afghan refugees becomes less politically viable, they must support Turkey’s non-voluntary 
returns of the Afghan refugees. If the EU really believed what they said on 14 December 
2017, then they would not engage in such a deal with Turkey that supports such mass 
deportations.  
N. CONCLUSION   
Livelihood for returnees, resilience for existing communities, aid support for the 
state, and a decrease in the flow of refugees to Europe were the mutual benefits that were 
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hoped to be achieved from the JWF. Overall, the JWF has provided outstanding benefits 
to one of the four parties concerned, which is GIRoA. In 2016, when GIRoA made this 
deal, there were over 1 million refugees returning to Afghanistan, and the approximate 
eight thousand more that came from Europe was not a large price to pay to ensure a CAPD 
with the EU and ensure increased aid support. GIRoA took advantage of an opportunity to 
utilize its migration challenges to pursue national priorities. It is likely that these gains, are 
what motivated Afghanistan to be the first Asian country to join the Comprehensive 
Refugee Response Framework in 2018, which aligns with the principles found in the GCR. 
The EU, on the other hand, has not gained a great advantage through the JWF, because the 
amount of returns from Europe has remained relatively consistent. However, due to the 
JWF, the EU has taken severe criticism for their lack of transparency in creating a non-
binding agreement, which avoids parliamentary oversight, and for the human rights 
concerns associated with the deal and its execution. Indeed, the EU has lost some of its 
legitimacy as a standard-bearer for human rights and the rule of law, but its major gain is 
that it is able to use the JWF to support Turkey’s Afghan migration problem. Turkey’s 
efforts of mass deportation mutually support the EU’s goals.  
The existing communities and returnees have benefited from community 
development projects and reintegration programs as the EU and others pump development 
aid into the country. There is no doubt some individuals and families are benefiting. Yet it 
is not on a large scale. The EU’s efforts at reintegration and community development 
appear to affect only a handful of the hundreds of thousands of returnees that come every 
year, especially as reintegration packages target mainly those coming from Turkey and 
Europe. Yet overall, returnees coming from Europe benefit is a net negative due to the 
economic and livelihood challenges, human rights violations, and security concerns they 
face upon return. There cannot be an overall positive benefit for returnees coming to 
Afghanistan while there is still widespread violence. Mutual gains as advocated in the JWF, 
which aligned with the principles in the GCR has not produced mutual gain in this case. 
Rather it was a reiteration of failed repatriation attempts of the past as the EU tried to 
promote the return of refugees prematurely before the environment was right. Patience by 
host nations who have Afghan refugees and support by the international community for 
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them should be the primary goal until the conflict in Afghanistan is fully resolved and 
proper conditions are established. Overall, the JWF benefited GIRoA greatly and a small 
percentage of returnees and existing communities in Afghanistan gained, but it was at the 
cost of their European Afghan Returnees drinking the poison cup.  
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V. CONCLUSION  
The question that drove this research was: Can a wealthy nation or regional power 
implement solutions to migration that can morally and effectively reduce migration at 
home, help refugees, and develop host nations or countries of origin and their 
communities? This question also explored whether the solutions of the GCM and the GCR 
advocated by the new international refugee regime are effective at solving refugee 
migration problems. In order to answer this important question, this thesis analyzed the 
EU’s migration deals with Jordan and Afghanistan to determine whether the new methods 
for addressing the refugee crisis produced mutual gains for the various parties. After 
examining the EU-Jordan Compact and the EU-Afghanistan Joint Way Forward 
Agreement, this research concludes that states benefited the most from these deals, while 
refugees and local communities saw minimal or no gains. This chapter compares the results 
observed by the EU, the states, communities, and refugees involved in the implementation 
of the novel solutions to the ongoing global refugee crisis, and reveals lessons learned 
regarding each of the groups. Lastly, this chapter will conclude with U.S. policy 
recommendations. 
A. LESSONS LEARNED 
1. States  
The case studies revealed that states benefit most from the migration deals with the 
EU, due to the significant increases in aid and the formation of long-term political and 
economic relationships. In both Afghanistan and Jordan, the states developed new 
organizational structures in order to take ownership of the migration situation within a year 
of the EU approaching them to begin talks on addressing migration. Jordan created the 
Jordan Information Management System for the Syria Crisis (JORISS), while Afghanistan 
created both the High Council on Migration and the Displacement and Return Executive 
Committee (DiREC) as discussed in chapter four. These reorganization efforts allowed 
both Jordan and Afghanistan to take the lead in managing the migration situations in their 
countries, while enabling them to more effectively direct   foreign aid toward their national 
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priorities and goals. Aid received from abroad was most utilized for development. This was 
not a result of any deal by the EU, rather, this was merely a product of the new institutions 
within Afghanistan and Jordan using foreign aid effectively to support national 
development. In addition to receiving billions of dollars’ worth of aid and the ability to 
pursue new national development goals, the states also benefited from establishing a long-
term relationship with the EU. This is especially true for Afghanistan, as the JWF led to 
the signing of the CAPD, which is the first legally binding partnership between the EU and 
Afghanistan. In the case of Jordan, it received a long desired relaxed ROO trade incentive, 
which is a great opportunity for economic development that has not fully been realized yet. 
Both countries benefit from newly established long-term relationships with the EU across 
a wide array of areas to include economic, political, and security arenas in addition to 
migration.  
The most significant lesson learned from observing the effect of the new refugee 
regime on the states is that the states receiving aid are incentivized to seek migration 
agreements with regional powers, but that national ownership is required. Afghanistan and 
Jordan both showed that capitalizing on such a relationship required them to take 
ownership of their migration crisis, which enabled them to effectively utilize monetary 
support in pursuit of a clearly defined national development agenda. Lastly, the research 
revealed that states remain self-interested, and will take most of the gains for larger state 
development objectives at the expense of individual refugees unless there are specific 
measures in place to ensure the gains are distributed to refugees and returnees.  
2. European Union  
Originally, this thesis hypothesized that the EU as a regional power would ensure 
its own self-interest above all others and guarantee its own gains at the expense of the other 
states involved. Although this idea seems intuitive, the results are different. As mentioned 
in chapter two, the EU outsourced its migration control effort to third countries both as a 
self-preservation technique as a supra-national entity, and to preserve its identity as a leader 
in humanitarian principles and a unified bloc of European nations working to preserve 
peace and prosperity. To avoid further anti-EU and anti-immigration sentiment, it decided 
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to not debate EU policy internally, but to make deals with third countries to decrease 
migration. The EU worked to stem the flow of migrants to avoid fragmentation of member 
states and to prevent deaths in the Mediterranean, thus restoring its legitimacy as a leader 
in human rights. Overall, the EU has been able to drastically reduce the flow of migrants 
by outsourcing migration control efforts to host nations and countries of origin. From 2015 
to 2018, border crossings fell from 1.8 million to under 200 thousand, representing a 90% 
decrease.310  
Although the EU achieved its goal of reducing the flow of migrants into the 
Eurozone, it is unlikely that the deals signed with Afghanistan and Jordan played a major 
role in achieving the reduction. Overall, the research shows that the EUs efforts in 
Afghanistan and Jordan did not decrease migration, but further hurt their international 
legitimacy as a protector of human rights. After the Jordan Compact was signed, Jordan 
closed its borders to Syria and took on no major additional refugee flows. One might argue 
that the Jordan Compact discouraged refugees from migrating to Europe, but there is no 
evidence to suggest this. The EU investment in Jordan produced little if anything in return.  
In Afghanistan, the EU’s return on investment was even worse. The JWF did not 
produce the ability to repatriate any more Afghans than before the agreement as discussed 
in chapter four. Furthermore, the EU gained little from decreasing its illegal Afghan 
population, but saw a further erosion of its perceived legitimacy as a world leader in human 
rights due to the secretive nature of the JWF negotiations and the premature return of 
Afghans to an unsafe and unsuitable environment. The EU signed the deal without the 
oversight of the EU parliament, showing a lack of respect for the rule of law and for 
transparency and attracting widespread international condemnation. The EU pressured 
Afghanistan into the agreement with incentives such as aid and a CAPD. Pakistan and Iran 
have returned millions of Afghans in recent years, far outpacing the numbers of returnees 
departing Europe. Despite this, EU still proclaims to live by a higher set of values regarding 
human rights. Even though the EU understood the importance of guaranteeing that 
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returnees should arrive in a safe environment, the EU still returned Afghan refugees to 
areas that were highly unstable. Although the EU admitted to violations of human rights in 
executing the JWF, it continued the repatriation of Afghans to maintain its migration deals 
with Turkey, which has been successful at decreasing the flow of refugees into Europe.  
The success of the Brexit movement in the United Kingdom is a powerful reminder 
that migration challenges have the power to completely dissolve the EU. In light of this, 
the EU seeks to decrease migration at all costs, and its actions show that EU politicians are 
willing to neglect human rights if needed to preserve the unity of the Eurozone. The EU 
will remain committed to outsourcing migration control to third countries in an effort stem 
the flow of refugees into the Eurozone and preserve the unity of the European Union. 
The principle lesson learned from examining the European Union’s efforts to 
address the refugee crisis is that outsourcing can be very effective at reducing migration, 
although in these two cases it had little effect. Regardless, regional powers around the 
world may notice the overall effectiveness of the European migration policies and want to 
replicate them in their own region. Both cases have shown that the EU’s migration strategy 
is not always effective, and that caution should be taken in accepting the EU’s strategy 
outright. In the case of Afghanistan, the EU’s policies came at the cost of discrediting the 
EU’s record as a humanitarian world leader by displaying a lack of concern for human 
rights and the rule of law. Outsourcing migration presents ethical and moral dilemmas for 
regional powers that may present a choice between decreasing migration and living by 
democratic and humanitarian principles. Mutually beneficial outcomes are more likely to 
occur if negotiations are transparent and there is internal and/or external oversight. 
Regional powers are also able to provide significant incentives for host nations to locally 
integrate refugees, such as in the Jordan case. The two case studies both demonstrate that 
wealthy regional powers are best able to implement solutions to stem the flow of refugees. 
The success or failure of agreements that follow the principles of  the GCM and GCR is 
largely dependent on whether these wealthy regional actors remain committed to protecting 
human rights and implementing a mutually beneficial solution, or if they instead opt to 
pursue more narrowly defined gains at the expense of the refugees.  
95 
3. Host and Existing Communities  
Communities within Afghanistan and Jordan benefited to some degree due to the 
state’s desire to avoid domestic political backlash. Avoiding domestic political backlash 
requires a state to consider the needs of the community when structuring any international 
agreement regarding the handling of refugees. In this way, communities benefitted 
indirectly from the solutions and agreements negotiated by the state. Jordanian leaders were 
especially concerned about appeasing the Jordanian community, and the government 
ensured that the benefit to the host community would outweigh the benefits to the refugees. 
One of the primary ways this was supposed to benefit Jordanian communities was through 
economic growth provided by EU trade incentives   provided to Jordan through relaxed 
ROOs in SEZs. These special economic zones eventually expanded to encompass the entire 
country of Jordan, but Jordan’s economy did not expand as rapidly as many had hoped. 
Jordan is still working to encourage investment and exploit the opportunity of having a 
relaxed ROO trade deal with the EU. However, community development projects made 
possible by EU funding have still helped both communities in Afghanistan and Jordan to 
some degree, despite the disappointing lack of economic growth in the wake of the EU 
trade deals. Overall, the Afghan and Jordanian communities did benefit, although this 
benefit was less than anticipated, and still far less than the benefits enjoyed by the 
overarching state. 
The lesson learned in regard to communities is that they benefit through 
development projects and job opportunities but are still constrained in their overall ability 
to benefit from the agreements if the overall economy does not expand. Trade incentives 
can be a great part of a migration deal, but if the host nation does not have the institutional 
knowledge or capability to exploit the trade incentive, then citizens will not benefit. This 
was seen in Jordan’s failure to fully exploit the economic benefits derived from its deal 
with the EU. Economic growth is needed to create new jobs needed for citizens and 
refugees. Without significant economic growth, development projects, skills development, 
and job opportunities will benefit only a few families, but not fully impact the entire host 
nation community for positive gains. Gains will only remain with the few who get to 
participate in any of the initiatives by the regional power.  
96 
4. Refugees and Returnees 
 There are mixed results when comparing refugees in Jordan and returnees in 
Afghanistan. The benefit for Afghans who returned from Europe due to the JWF was 
largely negative due to the poor security environment and weak economy in Afghanistan. 
Afghanistan remains one of the most dangerous places on the earth with one of the world’s 
most underdeveloped economies. Most returnees were better off in host nations prior to 
their repatriation. However, the Jordan case shows a glimmer of hope that the principles of 
the GCM and GCR can provide gains for refugees. Syrian refugees in Jordan, prior to the 
Jordan Compact, were almost completely denied the opportunity to access livelihood 
opportunities. The Jordan Compact incentivized the state to partially integrate the refugees 
into the formal labor market by ensuring that a certain amount of Syrian refugees would be 
present in jobs that were utilizing the SEZs, and by requiring Jordan to issue 200 thousand 
work permits to Syrian refugees. Despite the SEZ venture severely underperforming, the 
effort to integrate Syrians into the formal labor market has had some positive results. Since 
2016, over 179 thousand work permits have been issued, with over 40 thousand of them 
originating from the refugee camps.311 If the percentage of active permits stayed the same 
from 2018, then approximately over 50 thousand active permits exist in Jordan. Work 
permits provide significantly more opportunities for refugees than in the era prior to the 
signing of the compact. This is especially the case for those who have permits in the camps, 
as they are authorized freedom of mobility in Jordan with an active permit. Syrian refugees 
are still largely excluded from the formal labor market in many industries, but the Jordan 
Compact demonstrates that there is a way to encourage states to move toward local 
integration. As long as Jordan wants to maintain its relationship with the EU, then there is 
an opportunity for the EU to push Jordan towards further integration measures. This is slow 
uncomfortable progress, but the EU should continue to move this important initiative 
forward. The EU should self-examine how it spends its money, and only approve future 
funding that meets the goals of mutual gains for all, with special emphasis on furthering 
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local integration for refugees.312 The EU should adapt, be a better learning organization, 
and hold Jordan accountable.  
The lesson learned in regard to refugees is that states have little interest in 
protecting the rights of refugees. The problem is that there is no one who is negotiating on 
behalf of the refugees. Unless refugees want to be pawns in international relations then 
someone must sit at the negotiating table who advocates for them. In cases of repatriation, 
internal or external organizations should be able to confirm or deny that the environment 
for return is suitable. Additionally, to protect refugees, migration deals should not be 
secretive, but be fully transparent. In cases where states are incentivized to integrate 
refugees there needs to be more accountability and monitoring mechanisms to push host 
states to provide the necessary protections and integration for refugees. Regional powers 
should remain a learning organization and make all money or aid conditional upon meeting 
mutual gains with an emphasis on promoting local integration. If this is done, further 
progress may be possible.  
B. U.S. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS  
The U.S. could promote the ideals of the GCR and GCM to decrease migration into 
the U.S. by enacting policies to help develop countries in the western hemisphere and 
encourage other nations to host refugees. I recommend that outsourcing migration to other 
countries can be effective under the following conditions: 
• The U.S. should adopt the GCM and GCR and seek to ensure mutual gains 
for all in any migration deal. To ensure this, the U.S. should encourage a 
representative for refugees or migrants be allowed to participate in the 
negotiations between the U.S. and the host nation or COO. 
• A pre-requisite for any host nation or COO to receive such a migration 
deal should be that it must have complete ownership of the migration 
situation through having the appropriate government agencies to lead and 
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promote local integration and national resilience. Additionally, host 
nations or COO must have a deliberate national development plan. 
Providing money or aid to a weak national government with no way of 
promoting mutual gains is wasteful and inefficient.  
• Aid should be dependent upon strict accountability measures to integrate 
refugees locally. Trade measures could be utilized to benefit and build the 
economy of the host nation, but the deal should include other capacity 
building measures to help the host nation exploit the trade opportunity.  
• For cases of repatriation, there should be an authoritative council, 
potentially in Congress or the Department of State, that determines the 
suitability of return to every country and whether repatriation is authorized 
or not.  
• Constant monitoring, assessments, and feedback of the situation on the 
ground by an U.S. agency should be required to determine whether the 
mutual gains agreed upon in the negotiations are occurring and if money is 
being used effectively. Adjustments should be made as needed to ensure 
money is being used to achieve all U.S. interests and to promote resiliency 
and livelihood of all.  
• All migration deals must be viewed with great transparency to maintain 
the legitimacy of the values of the United States and for the protection of 
refugees and migrants.  
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